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I. INTRODUCTION
In many parts of the nation, tense relations between the police and
private citizenry have placed law enforcement operations under intense
public scrutiny. From coast to coast, commissions and internal affairs
units are being employed to investigate allegations of law enforcement
misconduct and corruption. These investigations typically culminate in
the issuance of an investigatory report. In some instances these reports
have been highly critical of law enforcement agencies and, not surpris-
ingly, well-publicized by the media.
In New York, the Mollen Commission found the New York City
Police Department rampant with corruption throughout its ranks, a
complete collapse of command responsibility, and a powerful "code of
silence."' The New York Temporary Commission of Investigation
found that the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office and Police
Department tolerated and ratified serious incidents of police miscon-
duct.2 In California, the Christopher Commission, created in response
to the Rodney King beating, found the Los Angeles Police Department
guilty of widespread use of excessive force, racism, and inadequate
supervision, and found a seriously flawed civilian complaint review
system resulting primarily from the officers' code of silence.3
Not all law enforcement investigatory reports are of such a grand
scale. Investigatory reports of law enforcement activities may concern
particular incidents,4 systemic problems,5 or both. A particularly well-
1. City of New York, COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OFTHE POLICE DEPARTMENT (July
7, 1994). See C. Krauss, 2-Year Corruption Inquiry Finds a 'Willful Blindness' In New York's
Police Department, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at 1.
2. Temporary Commission of Investigation of the State of New York, AN INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATrORNEY'S OFFICE AND POLICE DEPARTMENT
(1989). See Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 926 F.2d 142
(2d Cir. 1991).
3. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT (July 7, 1991). See Montiel v. City of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1993).
4. For decisions involving investigatory reports of particular incidents, see, e.g., Kinan
v. City of Brockton, 876 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1989); McQuaig v. McCoy, 806 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir.
1987); Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Swietlowich v.
County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1979).
5. For decisions involving investigatory reports of systemic problems, see, e.g., Falk v.
County of Suffolk, 781 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d
142 (2d Cir. 1991), affg 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Anderson v. City of N.Y., 657 F.
Supp. 1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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publicized incident, such as that involving Rodney King, may be
symptomatic of what is thought to be a systemic problem and, thus,
trigger a broad-based investigation.
Are investigatory reports of law enforcement activities admissible in
federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging
the constitutionality of the conduct of law enforcement officers?6
Reports of a particular incident are relevant to the issue of the
individual liability of the particular officer or officers charged with
constitutional wrongdoing.7 Reports on systemic issues may be highly
probative on the issue of municipal liability.8 Whether of an individual
incident, systemic problem, or both, because these reports carry the
imprimatur of government, they may be given great weight by the trier-
of-fact.9 However, because the reliability of investigatory reports can
and does vary greatly from case to case, this weight may or may not be
deserved."°
The admissibility of governmental investigatory reports typically
raises difficult contentious issues. As a starting point, the report itself,
when offered for its truth, is hearsay." Moreover, investigatory reports
frequently contain findings and conclusions that are not based upon the
investigating officer's personal knowledge. An investigation may involve
not only an analysis of the scene of the incident, but also the investiga-
tor's interviews and discussions with individuals who themselves may, or
may not, have personal knowledge. A hearing may or may not be held.
If a hearing is held, the reliability of the testimony given can vary
6. For an overview of the law pertinent to § 1983 actions contesting law enforcement
activities, see infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
§ 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
7. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 459-60. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 229-37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 144-86 and accompanying text.
11. Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." A "statement" is defined in part as "an oral or
written assertion... intended by the person as an assertion." FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
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greatly from case to case, and indeed, from witness to witness.
Investigations may also rely upon written documents, including studies
and reports, which are themselves hearsay. Other variables may
significantly impact upon the report's reliability. The time when the
investigation was carried out in relation to the pertinent events, the
procedures used in conducting the investigation, the thoroughness of the
investigation, whether a public hearing was held, and the skills,
experience, motivations, and biases of the investigating officers can and
do differ greatly from case to case. 2 It is thus not difficult to see how
the reliability of investigatory reports can vary greatly from case to case.
Nevertheless, Congress found overall that governmental investigatory
reports are sufficiently reliable to justify the creation of a specific
hearsay exception for them. Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence creates a hearsay exception "in civil actions and proceedings
and against the Government in criminal cases" for public records
containing "factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."' 3 Under this
rule, investigatory reports may be admitted into evidence even though
the investigators, the preparers of the report, and the suppliers of
information are not subject to cross-examination at trial. 4
The Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay exception goes far beyond the common
law exception for public records, 5 is controversial and complex, raises
12. See infra notes 146-63 and accompanying text.
13. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) provides a hearsay exception for: "in civil
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."
14. Rule 803 does not require the opportunity for such cross-examination. See Steven
P. Grossman & Stephen J. Shapiro, The Admission of Government Fact Findings Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C): Limiting the Dangers of Unreliable Hearsay, 38 KAN. L.
REV. 767, 773 (1990).
15. At common law there was "disagreement among the decisions" over the
admissibility of investigatory reports. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(c) advisory committee's note.
The disagreement was "due in part, no doubt, to the variety of situations encountered, as well
as to differences in principle." Id. The prevailing view was that investigatory reports were
admissible only insofar as they reflected the officer's first-hand knowledge and not for their
evaluative conclusions. Charles T. McCormick, Can The Courts Make Wider Use of Reports
of Official Investigations?, 42 IOWA L. REv. 363 (1957). Professor McCormick's article
advocated broader admissibility of investigatory reports, including those containing opinions.
Id. at 365. The Supreme Court has referred to Professor McCormick's "influential article
relied upon by the [Advisory] Committee...." Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 166
n.10 (1988).
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numerous difficult evidentiary issues, and has generated a great deal of
scholarly commentary. 6 As one federal district court observed:
Section (C)... is quite complex, and represents a major change
from common law principles. For, quite contrary to what was
generally permitted at common law, under the aegis of 803(8)(C),
materials representing the distillation of a process that may have
involved years of investigation and the taking of thousands of
pages of testimony may be presented to the trier of fact in one
fell SWoop. 17
Because it is "such a potent litigation tool, the parties are prone to
skirmish mightily over the trustworthiness vel non of public records and
reports.1
18
The admissibility of investigatory reports raises an unusually broad
range of potentially significant evidentiary issues. To begin with, a
number of important issues are raised by Rule 803(8)(C) itself,
including: (1) what is encompassed within the rule's reference to "factual
findings resulting from an investigation?"; 9 (2) how should an investi-
gatory report's "trustworthiness" be evaluated?;2' and (3) does the Rule
803(8)(C) hearsay exception encompass the accompanying data and
information upon which the findings are based?21 Of these Rule
803(8)(C) issues, trustworthiness is by far the most frequently and
sharply contested issue.
16. See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 767; Jonathon E. Grant, The
Trustworthiness Standard for the Public Records and Reports Hearsay Exception, 12 W. ST.
L. REV. 53 (1984); Kevin F. Bruen, Comment, Evidence Opinions and Conclusions Admissible
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439
(1988), 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 929 (1989); James M. Garner, Comment, The Public
Documents Hearsay Exception for Evaluative Reports: Fact or Fiction? 63 TUL. L. REv. 121
(1988); Kimberly K. Greene, Comment, The Admissibility of Evaluative Reports Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8), 68 KY. L.J. 197 (1979-80); Ross P. Masler, Comment, The Towering
Inferno: Trustworthiness of the Tower Report Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 55
BROOK. L. REV. 625 (1989); Comment, The Admissibility of Police Reports Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 691 (1976); Cheryl Musselman-Brown, Note, Admitting
Opinions and Conclusions in Evaluative Reports: The Trustworthiness Inquiry-Beech Aircraft
v. Rainey, 64 WASH. L. REv. 975 (1989); Penelope E. Nicholson, Note, The Scope of Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 59 TFX. L. REV. 155 (1980); Note, The Trustworthiness of
Government Evaluative Reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C), 96 HARV. L. REV.
492 (1982).
17. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1143 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
18. Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1146.
19. See infra notes 78-119 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 144-63 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 120-43 and accompanying text.
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But that is not all. In addition to the issues raised by Rule 803-
(8)(C), other significant evidentiary issues may be contested; namely,
relevance and Rule 403 balancing,' the Rule 407 exclusionary rule for
subsequent remedial measures,' and the invocation of a governmental
privilege. 4
At this point in time, twenty years after the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, a somewhat specialized and extensive body of
decisional law has developed governing the admissibility of investigatory
reports in federal § 1983 actions. Decisions concerning the admissibility
of investigatory reports in non-§ 1983 cases can, of course, be quite
pertinent in § 1983 actions. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the
evidentiary decisions in § 1983 actions are likely to be the most relevant,
persuasive precedents when the admissibility issue arises in a § 1983
action. Experienced attorneys who prosecute and defend § 1983 actions,
when interviewed, generally agreed that an investigatory report is
typically very powerful evidence in these cases.' My primary purpose,
then, is to analyze the various evidentiary issues pertaining to the
admissibility of investigatory reports in § 1983 actions.
Substantial background must be laid in order to place the admissibili-
ty of investigatory reports in § 1983 actions in its proper context. Thus,
Part II commences with an overview of the law governing § 1983 claims
arising out of encounters with law enforcement officers. Part III in turn
provides an overview of the Rule 803(6) business records rule, the Rule
803(8) public records rule, and the relationship between these two rules.
The Article then turns to the heart of the matter. Part IV analyzes the
various facets of the Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay exception for investigatory
22. See infra notes 211-37 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 238-57 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 258-311 and accompanying text. Authentication is not a serious
problem because "[o]fficial records frequently are admissible without a foundation witness
because the self-authentication provisions of Rule 902 obviate the need for live foundation
testimony." GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 803.41, at 427 (1987).
See FED. R. EVID. 902(1) (public documents under seal); (2) (public documents not under
seal); (3) (certified copies of public documents); (5) (official publications); (8) (acknowledged
documents). See also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE,
§ 8.47, at 997 (1995).
25. Telephone Interview with Lawrence J. Brennan, Chief, Bureau of Tort and Civil
Rights Litigation, Nassau County Attorney, Sept. 14, 1994 (reports may be given "very strong
weight"); Personal Interview with Frederick K. Brewington (experienced plaintiffs' lawyer)
Oct. 27, 1994 (reports are "very important"); Telephone Interview with William Gibney,
Managing Attorney, Prisoners' Legal Services, Sept. 22, 1994 (weight may depend upon
sophistication of the jury); Telephone Interview with John Williams (experienced plaintiffs'
lawyer), Sept. 22, 1994 (report can be "very powerful").
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reports, with special attention given to the critical issues of "trustworthi-
ness." Part V discusses aspects of relevance, including Rule 403
balancing and the Rule 407 exclusionary rule for subsequent remedial
measures. Finally, Part VI analyzes the potentially pertinent govern-
mental privileges.
H. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS INVOLVING LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES: AN OVERVIEW
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against those who, under
color of state or local law, violated the plaintiff's federally protected
rights.26 It does not itself establish or create federally protected rights,
but only "gives a remedy" when the claimant demonstrates a violation
of rights protected by the federal Constitution or, in some instances, by
a federal statute other than § 1983.27
Large numbers of § 1983 actions arise out of encounters with law
enforcement officers. These claims may challenge, inter alia, the
constitutionality of aii investigatory stop, arrest, detention, search, or
prosecution. A large proportion of the claims assert the use of excessive
force by the police in the course of making an arrest3 Excessive
force-arrest claims are litigated under a Fourth Amendment objective
reasonableness standard.29 Under this standard, the constitutionality
of the officer's use of force must be evaluated in light of the particular
circumstances known to the officer "from the perspective of, a reason-
able officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,"
and "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense,
26. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,640
(1980); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
27. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). Accord
Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,278 (1985); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,816, reh'g denied, 473
U.S. 925 (1985); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 n.3 (1979).
The federal statutes that are enforceable under § 1983 raise an issue of some complexity.
See 1 MARTIN A. SCHVARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES ch. 4 (2d ed. 1991 & 1996 Cum. Supp. No.1). Section 1983 claims
arising out of encounters with law enforcement officers are typically premised upon alleged
federal constitutional, not federal statutory, violations.
28. See Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 27, § 3.6, at 137 & n.238.
29. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). See also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1
(1985) (deadly force).
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uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation."3
The § 1983 claim may be asserted against the officer involved in the
encounter in the officer's personal capacity, against the municipal entity,
or, as is common, against both the officer and the entity.' Law
enforcement officers sued in their personal capacities may assert the
qualified immunity defense, which raises the issue of whether the officer
violated clearly established federal law. Because there is no respon-
deat superior liability under § 1983, a municipal entity may be found
liable only if it is shown that the enforcement of a municipal policy or
practice, or the final decision of a policymaker, caused the violation of
the plaintiff's federally protected rights.33 The Supreme Court has
ruled that a municipality's deliberately indifferent training that caused
the deprivation of the claimant's federally protected rights may give rise
to § 1983 municipal liability.34 By logical extension the lower federal
courts have applied this ruling to claims arising out of failures to
supervise, discipline, and take remedial action.35 Investigatory reports
may contain especially important information and evidence when the
municipal liability claim is premised upon an alleged custom or practice
30. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. See also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988)
(en bane).
31. Suing an official in an official capacity is tantamount to suing the entity. Kentucky
PBA Bureau of State Police v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,
471-72 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of the City of N. Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690
n.55 (1978). On the distinctions between individual and official-capacity claims, see Graham,
473 U.S. at 165-66. See also Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991). On the relationship
between individual and municipal liability, see SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 27.
The text refers to "municipal" entities, as opposed to state entities, because the great
percentage of claims arising out of encounters with law enforcement officers involve
municipal, not state, officials. States, state agencies, and state officials in their official
capacities are not "persons" who may be sued under § 1983 for monetary relief. Will v.
Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991) (Bivens action; warrantless arrest);
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (Bivens action; warrantless search); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (arrest warrant application). See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982) (establishing objectively reasonable qualified immunity standard). The
lower courts are in conflict over whether qualified immunity may be asserted as a defense to
a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim or whether, in this context, the qualified immunity
defense is superfluous. See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 27, § 9.21 & 1996 Cum. Supp.
No. 1 (collecting decisions under subheading "Excessive Force").
33. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of the City of N. Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See
also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469 (1986).
34. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
35. SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 27, § 7.10 & 1996 Cum. Supp. No. 1.
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of official wrongdoing or upon inadequate training, supervision,
discipline, and remedial actions.
III. THE BUSINESS AND PUBLIC RECORDS EXCEPTIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Business Records
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) establishes the familiar hearsay
exception for regularly kept "business" records. 36 Although commonly
36. The advisory committee's note to Rule 803(6) explains that regularly kept business
records are thought to be unusually reliable because of the regularity with which they are
prepared and maintained, their systematic checking by auditors and others, the business duty
to make accurate records, and the reliance on these records by the business in making
decisions. An analysis of Rule 803(6) and its interpretive decisional law reveals that the
following requirements must be established in order to satisfy the business record rule:
1. The record must be "kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity." FED.
R. EVID. 803(6).
2. It must be "the regular practice of that business activity to make the.., record." See,
e.g., Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992) (§ 1983
action).
3. The record must be made by an employee with personal knowledge, or from information
transmitted by a person who has personal knowledge and a business duty to transmit the
information. All other intermediaries must also be under a business duty to transmit. The
advisory committee's note to Rule 803(6), citing what it describes as the "leading case" of
Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930), explains that when the supplier of the information,
such as a bystander, or any other participant in the record-making process does not act in the
regular course of business, an "essential link" of reliability is broken. FED. R. EvID. 803(6)
advisory committee's note.
4. If the person supplying the information does not have a business duty to transmit the
information, this requirement alte.rnatively can be satisfied by showing that the transmittal of
the information meets some other hearsay exemption or exception, such as an admission,
excited utterance, or declaration against interest. 2 JOHN W. STRONG, ET AL., MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 290, at 275 (4th ed. 1992); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 803(6)[04] (1987).
5. The record must be "made at or near the time" of the transaction. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
These "foundation" requirements must be substantiated by the "testimony of the
custodian [of the records] or other qualified witness ... ." FED. R. EVID. 803(6). This
foundation testimony can be given by anyone who has personal knowledge of the
organization's record-keeping procedures. "[T]here is no requirement that this witness must
have firsthand knowledge of the matter reported or actually have prepared the report or
observed its preparation." WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra § 803(6)[04].
Even if all of the requisites of the business record hearsay exception are met, Rule 803(6)
authorizes exclusion of the record if "the source of information or the method or circumstanc-
es of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803(6). This encompasses
the so-called motivational problems that arise when reports are prepared for purposes of
litigation, that is, the Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) problem. See, e.g., Wheeler v.
Sims, 951 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1992) (§ 1983 action); Dorsey v. City
of Detroit, 858 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1988) (§ 1983 action); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir.
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referred to as the "business" records rule, it is actually broader in scope.
Rule 803(6) broadly defines "business" to "include business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether
or not conducted for profit., 37 Thus, it is broad enough to include the
records of governmental entities. 31
A business record may consist of "[a] memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form . . . . The reference to "data
compilation" is intended to cover computer-generated records.' The
record may include opinions and diagnoses, such as those contained in
medical records41 and police reports. 4 The fact that the business
record rule encompasses governmental records raises the issue, discussed
1976) (§ 1983 action).
When a record meets the requirements of the business record rule, Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(7) provides that the failure of the record to include a transaction, which would
ordinarily be expected to be in a record of a regularly conducted business activity, is
admissible to prove the nonoccurrence of the event. The same 803(6) proviso appears in Rule
803(7): "unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness." A hypothetical example in the § 1983 setting would be a prison hospital record's
failure to show the admission of a particular prisoner on a particular occasion that is
introduced into evidence to show that the prisoner did not receive medical care on that date.
There are few reported decisions under Rule 803(7). See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL.,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1504-05 (6th ed. 1994) (annotating four cases).
Rule 803(7) is a potentially very useful tool for accomplishing the frequently difficult task of
proving a negative. Although the absence of an entry in a business record is probably not
even hearsay because there is simply no out-of-court statement being introduced, there were
some pre-rule decisions to the contrary, and Rule 803(7) sought "to set the question at rest
in favor of admissibility." FED. R. EVID. 803(7) advisory committee's note.
37. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
38. See Malek v. Federal Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1993) (department of social
services worker's notes within business records rule); Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.)
(prisoner's file), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989); Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 858 F.2d 338
(6th Cir. 1988) (police report); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 714 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1983)
(police department investigatory report); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976) (a
prison is a "business" under the business record rule). But see Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,
272 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The admissibility of such official documents under the Federal Rules of
Evidence is not determined by business records rules standards, but by Rule 803(8), which
provides for the admissibility of the reports of public agencies."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
39. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
40. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note. On the admissibility of computer-
generated records, see 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 294; MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.6 (3d ed. 1991).
41. 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 293.
42. See, e.g., Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 858 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1988) (§ 1983 action:
police report containing officer's opinion of nature and severity of plaintiff's injuries was
within the business records rule; report should have been excluded, however, because of
defendants' failure to produce it during discovery).
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below, concerning the relationship between the business and public
records hearsay exceptions.43 Before pursuing that issue, however, we
turn first to the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) exception for public
records.
B. Public Records
Like hearsay exceptions generally, the public records exception is
based upon the general trustworthiness of public records. Public records
are generally believed to be sufficiently trustworthy because it is
assumed that public officials will prepare accurate reports." The public
records exception is also justified by the public interest in avoiding
having public officials testify in court about the subject matter of
governmental reports.45 Further, there is great likelihood that the
record will be more reliable than the official's present testimony
reflecting memory of events that may have occurred many years ago.46
Public records may be utilized at trial for several purposes: to refresh
a witness's recollection, to memorialize an event under the doctrine of
past recollection recorded, to impeach with a prior inconsistent
statement, and to rehabilitate by showing a prior consistent statement.4 7
Rule 803(8), however, creates an independent hearsay exception for
public records, allowing them to be introduced for their truth. Of
course, like the other hearsay exceptions, Rule 803(8) only removes the
bar of the exclusionary rule against hearsay. Public records and reports
that satisfy Rule 803(8) must still clear other hurdles of admissibility,
such as relevance, Rule 403, specific exclusionary rules such as that for
remedial measures under Rule 407, authentication, and the various
privileges.
The Rule 803(8) hearsay exception is limited to records prepared by
governmental entities. In Lamphere v. Brown University,48 a Title VII
gender discrimination suit, the First Circuit ruled that the opinions of a
hearing panel comprised of university faculty members did not come
within Rule 803(8) because "the panels are not public agencies, and its
members are not public officials.5
49
43. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
44. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
45. 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 296.
46. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
47. GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 803.8, at 892 n.3.
48. 685 F.2d 743, 749 (1st Cir. 1982).
49. Id. See also Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1989)
(Rule 803(8)(C) inapplicable because report not prepared by public officials); In re Japanese
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Rule 803(8) establishes three categories of public records and
reports. It "has extraordinary breadth."5 Subdivision (A) provides an
exception for public records of "the activities of the office or agency."
This covers records of the agency's internal affairs, that is, of its
functions and activities, such as employment, inventory, and disburse-
ment records. 51 There is no requirement that the record be based upon
personal knowledge or even upon a governmental duty to transmit the
information. If the record is not sufficiently trustworthy, however, it can
be excluded under Rule 403.
Subdivision (B) provides a hearsay exception for public records
setting forth "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report ...."" Thus, for example,
in civil cases, a police officer's report of an accident or other law
enforcement matter based upon the officer's personal knowledge comes
within subdivision (B).53
The public records and reports covered by subdivisions (A) and (B)
are fairly straightforward and noncontroversial. The same cannot be
said of the subdivision (C) hearsay exception for investigatory reports.
Rule 803(8)(C) provides a hearsay exception in civil cases for public
records setting forth "factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness., 54
Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 272 (3d Cir. 1983) (documents "authored by
Matsushita rather than by a 'public office or agency' [not within] Rule 803(8)(C)"), rev'd on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632
(3d Cir. 1977) (Rule 803(8) exempts from hearsay rule only reports by public officials).
Although the investigation must be carried out by governmental officials, the information
may be obtained from individuals having no involvement "whatsoever" with government.
Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 768 & n.3 (citing numerous cases).
50. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, § 847, at 975.
51. See 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 296; FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A) advisory committee's
note.
52. The subdivision (B) hearsay exception does not encompass "in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel." FED. R. EVID.
803(8)(B) (emphasis omitted). This clause has been interpreted as barring the prosecution,
but not the defense, from introducing these reports in criminal cases. See 2 STRONG, supra
note 36, § 296, at 508.
53. See, e.g., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 933 (1979).
54. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C). In addition to civil cases, Rule 803(8)(C) authorizes the
admission of investigatory reports "against the Government in criminal cases." Id. (emphasis
added). This language makes clear that investigatory reports may not be introduced under
this subdivision by the government against a criminal defendant. This limitation was included
in Rule 803(8)(C) because of Confrontation Clause concerns. See United States v. Oates, 560
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This "represents a tremendous expansion of the typical public records
exception,"'55 is controversial, and raises multi-faceted and often highly
contentious evidentiary issues. It is the only public records hearsay
exception "that reaches material based on outside information,"
potentially embracing "multiple layers of hearsay as information is
passed among public officials before being finally recorded is [sic] what
is offered at trial."56 Nevertheless, it is justified on the ground that
"public officials have factfinding and evaluative expertise ....,57
Rule 803(8)(C) as written requires that (1) the report contain
"factual findings," (2) "resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law," and (3) is sufficiently trustworthy to justify its
admission into evidence. 8 Before analyzing these issues, however, we
pause to discuss the relationship between the Rule 803(6) business
record rule and the Rule 803(8) public record rule.
C. Relationship Between Business and Public Records Rules
A great deal of uncertainty surrounds the relationship between the
Rule 803(6) business records and the Rule 803(8) public records hearsay
exceptions. This issue has had its most significant, frequent, and difficult
applications in criminal cases. This is because of the restrictions in
Rules 803(8)(B) and (C) against introducing law enforcement and
investigatory reports against criminal defendants, and because of
F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
55. ABA SECTION ON LITIGATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 237 (2d ed. 1991) (hereinafter EMERGING PROBLEMS).
56. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, § 8.47, at 976. But see Miller v. Field,
35 F.3d 1088 (6th Cir. 1994) (§ 1983 action: limiting Rule 803(8)(C) to cases in which the
report is based upon the preparer's personal knowledge). For an analysis of Miller v. Field,
see infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
57. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, § 8.48, at 980. See also id. § 8.48, at 979-
80 (Rule 803(8)(C) parallels the treatment the Federal Rules of Evidence affords expert
witnesses). There is no requirement, however, that the investigators and authors of the report
be qualified as experts. Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994).
58. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C). Rule 803(10) is the public records counterpart to Rule
803(7). See supra note 36. It provides that the nonoccurrence of an event may be shown by
its absence in a "regularly made and preserved" public record. Rule 803(10) also allows the
absence of a public report to be shown by "certification in accordance with Rule 902," or
testimony "that diligent search failed to disclose the record ...." The advisory committee's
note to Rule 803(10) states that it covers "situations in which absence of a record may itself
be the ultimate focal point of inquiry... as well as cases where the absence of a record is
offered as proof of the nonoccurrence of an event ordinarily recorded."
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Confrontation Clause concerns. 59 These are not pertinent factors in
civil rights actions filed under § 1983.
In civil cases, two major questions are presented: (1) when a public
record is sought to be introduced, which provision should the court look
to in the first instance, 803(6) or 803(8), or is either permissible?; (2) are
public records that do not meet the requirements of the public records
rule potentially admissible under the business records rule? It would
seem natural that the specific Rule 803(8) hearsay exception for public
records would be the first rule to which a federal court would turn when
a hearsay issue is raised regarding public records. In fact, "there is some
tendency to rely upon Rule 803(8) instead of Rule 803(6) for govern-
mental entities since the more particular rule usually controls."'  A
number of courts have taken this approach in § 1983 cases involving
investigatory reports. 61  On the other hand, there are a surprising
number of federal circuit court decisions in § 1983 cases that evaluate
the admissibility of public records solely on the basis of the business
records rule.62 These decisions either explicitly or implicitly take the
position that the broad definition of "business" in Rule 803(6) includes
governmental entities.63  Although this seems to be correct, it also
59. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
King, 613 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977); 2
STRONG, supra note 36, § 296, at 292-94. See also United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20 (2d
Cir. 1983).
60. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, § 803(6)[03], at 803-209.
61. Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); Perrin v. Anderson, 784
F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1984); Swietlowich v.
County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1979).
62. Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1993) (prison psychiatric progress notes);
Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.) (prison's record of plaintiff's medical condition), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1992); Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 858 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1988) (police
report); Walker v. Wayne County, Iowa, 850 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1988) (criminal investigation
report), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976)
(prison correctional counselor's account of incident).
63. Malek v. Federal Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1993) (department of social services
social worker's notes within business records rule); Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.)
(prisoner's file), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989); Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 858 F.2d 338
(6th Cir. 1988) (police report); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 714 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1983)
(police department investigatory report); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976) (a
prison is a "business" under the business record rule). But see Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,
272 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The admissibility of such official documents under the Federal Rules of
Evidence is not determined by business records rules standard but by Rule 803(8), which
provides for the admission of [the] reports of public agencies."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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seems unusual to evaluate a hearsay issue concerning a public record as
if the public records hearsay exception does not exist.64
The Sixth Circuit decision in Dorsey v. City of Detroit6 illustrates
the Rule 803(6) approach to public records in a § 1983 setting. In that
case, involving the alleged use of excessive force against a fleeing
misdemeanant and the arrest of his mother, the plaintiffs on appeal
urged that the district court erred in admitting Sergeant Graber's
investigatory report of the incident. Sergeant Graber's report summa-
rized information of the incident that had been provided to Graber by
fellow officers, and contained the following conclusion:
The writer's investigation reveals that the officers were engaged
in a lawful and proper police function. It is this writer's opinion
that Officers Butucel and Robinson used no more than necessary
force to effect the arrest of Mr. Dorsey. Officer Butucel appears
to have been injured as a result of police action. The alleged
injury to Robert Dorsey and the injury to Margaret Dorsey seem
minimal under the circumstances. Investigation reveals that both
parties were hostile and combative in their actions. The injuries
occurred as a direct result of their hostilities towards the
officers.6"
The plaintiffs advanced three reasons why this report should not
have been admitted under Rule 803(6). First, plaintiffs argued that a
proper foundation for admitting the report had not been laid. The
circuit court, however, found otherwise because "Officer Jones, who had
worked under Sergeant Graber's supervision, testified that Sergeant
Graber prepared such reports in the ordinary course of business, and
Jones identified the signature on the report as Sergeant Graber's."67
It was not necessary that Jones testify as to how Sergeant Graber
prepared the report because, under Rule 803(6), the qualifying witness
need only be familiar with the record-keeping system." The plaintiffs'
second argument was that the report contained information that was not
within Sergeant Graber's personal knowledge. This argument was
without merit because a business record can be prepared on the basis of
information supplied by one with personal knowledge and a business
64. In Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918
(1986), the court evaluated the admissibility of a governmental report under Rule 803(6) and
Rule 803(8)(C) jointly, that is, it engaged in one trustworthy evaluation under both rules.
65. 858 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1988).
66. Id. at 343.
67. Id. at 342.
68. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, § 803(6)[02]; 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 292.
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duty to transmit the information; it is not necessary that the recorder
have personal knowledge.69 Third, the plaintiffs argued that the report
was not trustworthy because it contained Sergeant Graber's personal
opinions. Rule 803(6), however, specifically permits opinions in business
records. Although the Graber report did raise motivational problems
because it appeared to have been prepared with an eye toward litigation,
it was nevertheless within the district court's discretion to find the report
sufficiently trustworthy.7' Furthermore, although the circuit court in
Dorsey found that the district court did not err in finding that the report
met all of the requirements of the business records rule, it also found a
significant reason why the report should have been excluded. The
defendants' failure to produce the report during pretrial discovery
deprived the plaintiffs of a fair opportunity to contest its trustworthiness
at trial. For this reason the report should have been excluded.
What is most striking about the circuit court's decision in Dorsey is
its failure even to mention the 803(8)(C) investigatory hearsay excep-
tion. After all, since the admissibility of Sergeant Graber's investigatory
report was at issue, it seems reasonable to expect the court to make
some reference to the specific hearsay exception that exists for
governmental investigatory reports.
It is likely, however, that the court's evaluation and decision would
have focused on substantially the same factors under Rule 803(8)(C) as
it did under Rule 803(6). This is because trustworthiness is the most
critical factor under both Rule 803(6) and Rule 803(8)(C). Further, the
circuit court's reasoning that the defendants' failure to produce the
report during pretrial discovery justified its exclusion, because it
69. See supra note 36.
70. By contrast, in Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1993), a § 1983 action in
which the plaintiff prisoner alleged that correction officers used excessive force in restraining
him in order to allow a nurse to administer a sedative, the Second Circuit ruled that the
district court erred in allowing defendants to introduce the plaintiff's psychiatric "Progress
Notes," made by a nurse at the Mental Health Unit (MHU) the day after the incident in
question. The notes recorded an unidentified corrections officer's statement that Romano
admitted that he hurt his hand punching a wall. It was unclear whether the corrections officer
had a business duty to transmit the information to the MHU staff. More importantly, the
notes did not satisfy the trustworthy requirement of Rule 803(6). The officer in question was
one of the defendants, and the plaintiff "had threatened to blame his injuries on the officers
and... the officers were aware of Romano's threat." Id. at 108. Under these circumstances,
the corrections officer had a motive to "judge" what happened to Romano. Id. Therefore,
the officer's statement recorded on the notes did not carry "the requisite degree of
trustworthiness essential to the business records exception." Id.
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deprived the plaintiffs of a fair opportunity to contest its trustworthiness,
should pertain equally under Rule 803(8)(C).
In Dorsey, the circuit court tested the admissibility of the public
record solely under the business records rule. As noted above, however,
when the admissibility of a public record is at issue, it is more likely that
a federal court will turn at least initially to the specific Rule 803(8)
hearsay exception for public records. Assuming that a court first tests
the admissibility of a public record under the public records hearsay
exception and finds it inadmissible, may the proponent then seek to
admit it under the business records rule? Although the answer is not
free from doubt, the business records rule, in theory, should be viewed
as an alternative basis of admissibility. After all, the public record is
hearsay because it is an out-of-court statement being offered for its
truth. Thus, if the record meets any hearsay exception, it should be
viewed as having overcome the hearsay hurdle. Because Rule 803(8) is
a rule of admissibility, public records that do not meet the requirements
of that rule should be admissible if they meet the requirements of some
other hearsay exception.7 Nevertheless, some federal court decisions
hold that the specific Rule 803(8) hearsay exception is the exclusive
hearsay exception for public records.72
Although the relationship between the business and public records
rules is significant in criminal cases in which the government seeks to
introduce either a law enforcement officer's report based upon personal
knowledge, or an investigatory report, against the defendant,73 the
relationship between the two rules seems to arise relatively infrequently
in civil cases. This may be because the public records rule is broader
and generally easier to satisfy than the business records rule:
(1) Unlike the business records exception, the public records rule
does not require the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness;74
71. EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 55, at 234.
72. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,272 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The admissibility of such official
documents under the Federal Rules of Evidence is not determined by business records rules
standards but by Rule 803(8), which provides for the admission of reports of public agen-
cies."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F.
Supp. 859, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Rule 803(6) is simply not applicable to government records
and reports, which are to be admitted in accordance with the standards of Rule 803(8).").
73. See cases cited supra note 59.
74. WEISSENBERGER, supra 24, § 803.41. "Official records frequently are admissible
without a foundation witness because the self-authentication provisions of Rule 902 obviate
the need for live foundational testimony." Il at 427.
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(2) In contrast to the business record rule, Rule 803(8) does not
require that a public record be created "contemporaneously" with the
event in question;75
(3) "Also, subdivisions (A) and (C) have no requirement that the
record be routinely maintained; 7 6
(4) In contrast to the business records rule, the investigatory reports
exception has no requirement that the information be recorded or
furnished by an individual with personal knowledge; and
(5) The most important requisite for admitting an investigatory report
under Rule 803(8)(C) is its trustworthiness, a requirement of the Rule
803(6) business records exception as well. An investigatory report that
is not trustworthy for purposes of Rule 803(8)(C) is also not trustworthy
for purposes of Rule 803(6).
When all of these factors are considered together, it is apparent that
both public records in general, and investigatory reports in particular,
that do not satisfy the requirements of the public records rule are
exceedingly unlikely to be able to meet the requirements of the business
records rule. Thus, while there is uncertainty regarding the relationship
between the business and public records rules, this issue is not of
particular significance in § 1983 civil rights suits. Despite the unusual
Rule 803(6) approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Dorsey, federal
courts in § 1983 actions normally have taken the sensible approach and
analyzed the issue under the specific Rule 803(8)(C) exception for
investigatory reports.17
IV. THE RULE 803(8)(C) HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR INVESTIGA-
TORY REPORTS
A. Findings Resulting From Investigations
The Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay exception for investigatory reports, by
its terms, encompasses "factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Montiel v. City of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1993); Gentile v.
County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); McQuaig v. McCoy, 806 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir.
1987); Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985); Swietlowich v. County of
Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1979); Falk v. County of Suffolk, 781 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); Anderson v. City of N.Y., 657 F. Supp 1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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Like Rule 803(8) generally, this hearsay exception pertains only to
investigatory reports prepared by governmental officials.78 Further, the
investigation must be authorized by legal authority: "This requirement
helps to ensure that the report is reliable. ' 79  The investigation,
however, need only be authorized, not mandated, by law.8"
In some cases, issues have been raised as to whether the governmen-
tal action was investigatory in nature. The issue has principally arisen
with respect to (a) quasi-judicial administrative findings; (b) rulemaking;
and (c) judicial findings. In Chandler v. Roudebush,8" a Title VII suit,
the Supreme Court, citing Rule 803(8)(C), stated that "[p]rior adminis-
trative findings made with respect to an employment discrimination
claim may, of course, be admitted as evidence at a federal sector trial de
novo." A recent study of the Federal Rules of Evidence concluded that
"[w]ith respect to adjudicatory findings, the courts of appeals have
uniformly followed Chandler's lead."'
The Chandler line of decisions is of potential significance in § 1983
actions. Although the Supreme Court has resolved that § 1983 claimants
are not obligated to exhaust state administrative remedies,83 they
nevertheless may at their option choose to do so.84 Then, too, in some
instances a state or local agency may institute quasi-judicial administra-
tive proceedings against a private party, such as a license revocation
proceeding.85 Whether the agency proceeding was instituted by the
private party or by the government, the administrative findings may
come within Rule 803(8)(C).
No reported § 1983 cases have been located, however, in which this
evidentiary issue has arisen. This is presumably because quasi-judicial
78. See Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1989); Lamphere
v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743 (1st Cir. 1982); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563
F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977).
79. Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1046 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Keith v. Volpe,
858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) (report was not used solely for litigation purposes), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 813 (1989).
80. Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 726 n.15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
918 (1986); Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
81. 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976).
82. EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 55, at 236. See also WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 36, § 803(8)[03]. See, e.g., Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d
1339 (6th Cir. 1978); Colston v. Pingree, 498 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Fla. 1980).
83. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). See also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131 (1988).
84. See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 27, § 10.4.
85. Id. §§ 10.4, 14.9.
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administrative findings may be entitled to preclusive effect in federal
court § 1983 actions as a matter of administrative res judicata.86
Although it has been claimed in a large number of federal § 1983 actions
that agency findings are entitled to preclusive effect, the issue has been
uniformly handled as a straight issue of preclusion law, rather than as an
evidentiary issue. 7
There is authority that Rule 803(8)(C) does not cover rulemaking
proceedings. The issue was analyzed carefully in United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.88 In that antitrust action, the
court was asked to determine the admissibility of several decisions of the
Federal Communications Commission. The court reasoned that
proceedings that are clearly rulemaking because they are directed at the
regulation of future conduct "with any fact-finding at most incidental
and used primarily for predictive purposes ... [are] not addressed to
past facts ... and... therefore cannot result [in] factual findings under
Rule 803(8)(C).,, 89 Rulemaking is thus distinguished from proceedings
that are clearly adjudicatory, "that is, an investigation into disputed past
acts with a view to determining whether those acts meet certain legal
standards, with any prospective element being incidental-which
certainly could yield 803(8)(C) findings."9 ° The difficulty, however, was
that most of the materials before the court involved a mixture of agency
adjudication and rulemaking, so that it was not possible "to draw a hard-
and-fast distinction between rule making and fact-oriented adjudica-
tion."91 The court thus found it necessary to determine whether each
agency decision was predominantly of a rulemaking or adjudicatory
nature. An agency finding is not outside of Rule 803(8)(C) "merely
because it resulted from a procedure containing rulemaking ele-
ments."92 Although this issue can arise in § 1983 actions, no reported
§ 1983 decisions involving this issue have been located.
86. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986). See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN,
supra note 27, § 11.10. To be entitled to preclusive effect under Elliott, the agency must act
in a quasi-judicial capacity and its findings must be entitled to preclusive effect under the state
law of preclusion. See Nelson v. Jefferson County, 863 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 820 (1989).
87. See cases cited in SCHWARTZ AND KIRKLIN, supra note 27, § 11.10 & 1996 Cum.
Supp. No. 1.
88. 498 F. Supp. 353 (D. D.C. 1980).
89. Id. at 360-61.
90. Id. at 360 n.19.
91. Id. at 361.
92. Id. at 367.
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Several decisions hold that Rule 803(8)(C) does not cover judicial
findings. In Trustees of, University of Pennsylvania v. Lexington
Insurance Co.,93 the Third Circuit held that Rule 803(8)(C) is limited
to administrative and executive findings and does not cover judicial
findings. The court articulated several persuasive reasons to support this
conclusion:
Rule 803(8)(C) specifically refers to factual findings resulting
from 'an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law,' and the advisory committee's note focuses specifically on
the findings of officials and agencies within the executive branch.
Neither the advisory note nor the leading treatises make even the
remotest reference to judicial findings .... Furthermore, Rule
803(8)(C) requires the district court to determine if the 'source
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.' Because
a trustworthiness evaluation might involve calling the author of
the fact-finding or his staff members to permit parties to impeach
their work, the need for judicial confidentiality makes judicial
findings unsuitable for this scrutiny. Finally, the general rule is
that judicial findings are inadmissible against a party not present
in the prior litigation ......
The Fourth Circuit has provided additional reasons to support the
conclusion that Rule 803(8)(C) "applies to the findings of agencies and
offices of the executive branch, but does not apply to the findings of
judges.""5 Not only is a judge of a court of law not an investigator, but
there is also the danger that judicial findings, if admitted as evidence,
93. 815 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 905. Accord Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Jones, 29 F-3d 1549 (11th Cir. 1994); Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1993); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1184-86 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Contra La Marca v. Turner, 662 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (§ 1983 action: grand jury
presentment concerning prison conditions admitted under Rule 803(8)(C)). It has been
observed that although:
[i]t might seem odd that Rule 803(8)(C) does not appear to admit judge or jury
findings, although it plainly allows admission of findings that are probably less
reliable[, ... there is a good reason for excluding Judge and jury findings from the
coverage of the Rule: Whenever Rule 803(8)(C) allows findings to be admitted, it
leaves an opposing party free to challenge the reliability of the findings. Were Judge
and jury verdicts to be similarly treated, Judges and juries would be subject to much
more attack than at present. See, e.g., Rule 606(b).
SALTZBURG Er. AL., supra note 36, at 1426.
95. Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 1994). Accord Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F3d
415 (4th Cir. 1993).
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would likely be given undue weight by the jury, thereby creating a
danger of unfair prejudice. 6
As with administrative findings, in federal court § 1983 actions prior
judicial findings have usually raised purely legal preclusion issues rather
than evidentiary questions.9 7
B. Findings of Fact, Opinions, and Conclusions
Rule 803(8)(C) refers to a public records setting for the "factual
findings resulting from an investigation.... ." Following the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a conflict developed in the circuit
courts of appeals over whether Rule 803(8)(C) encompasses opinions
and conclusions, so-called evaluative reports. 8  The United States
Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey99
by unanimously ruling that investigatory reports that are otherwise
admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) are not rendered inadmissible merely
because they state a conclusion or opinion: "As long as the conclusion
is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness
requirement, it should be admissible along with other portions of the
report."'
Beech Aircraft Corp. was a products liability suit that arose out of
the crash of a naval training aircraft, which took the lives of both pilots
on board. Following the accident, an investigatory report was prepared
by a lieutenant commander. The report "was organized into sections
labeled 'finding of fact,' 'opinions,' and 'recommendations." '01 The
critical issue was the admissibility of those parts of the report containing
opinions, for example, that the most "probable cause of the accident was
the pilots [sic] failure to maintain proper interval."'" The Supreme
Court held that the report was admissible under Rule 803(8)(C).
In reaching this result, the Court relied upon such traditional indicia
of Congressional intent as the Rule's language, legislative history,
structure, and purpose. The language of Rule 803(8)(C) does not state
that "'factual findings are admissible' but that investigative "'reports...
96. Carter, 34 F.3d at 265; Nipper, 7 F.3d at 417-18.
97. See, e.g., Migra v. Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90 (1980); SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 27, ch. 11.
98. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1988) (describing
conflicting circuit court decisional law).
99. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
100. Id. at 170.
101. Id. at 157.
102. Id. at 158.
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setting forth... factual findings"' are admissible."° Under this literal
reading of Rule 803(8)(C), an investigatory report containing findings of
fact may be admissible and is not rendered inadmissible because it also
contains opinions and conclusions. On the other hand, "the requirement
that reports contain factual findings bars the admission of statements not
based on factual investigation.'
11 4
The Supreme Court found the legislative history of Rule 803(8)(C)
inconclusive because the House and Senate committees took directly
opposite positions concerning evaluative reports and made no effort to
reconcile them. 5 The advisory committee's note to the Rule, howev-
er, strongly supported the view that it encompasses "evaluative
reports." 105  Turning to the structure of the rules, the Court found
several safeguards against unreliable reports containing opinions and
conclusions. Rule 803(8)(C) itself has an escape clause for untrustwor-
thy reports, and Rule 403 requires consideration of the report's
probative value and danger of unfair prejudice. 7 The "ultimate
safeguard" is the opponent's right to introduce evidence attacking the
validity of the conclusions in the report."
The Court in Beech Aircraft found that a broad reading of Rule
803(8)(C) was consistent with the liberal treatment the Federal Rules
103. Id. at 164 (emphasis in original).
104. Id. at 169. The Court in Beech Aircraft specifically rejected the argument that
because the business record rule, FED. R. EVID. 803(6), specifically authorizes "opinions" and
"diagnoses," while the Rule 803(8)(C) investigatory report exception does not, opinions are
not within the scope of 803(8)(C). The advisory committee's note to 803(6) made clear that
opinions were expressly included in Rule 803(6) primarily to insure that medical diagnoses
would be covered under the business records rule. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 163 n.8.
While opinions were rarely found in traditional "business records," the expansion
of that category to encompass documents such as medical diagnoses and test results
brought with it some uncertainty in earlier versions of the Rule as to whether
diagnoses and the like were admissible. ... Since that specific concern was not
present in the context of Rule 803(8)(C), the absence of identical language should
not be accorded much significance.
Id.
105. Id. at 164-65 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 650,93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1973), reprinted
in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7088 and S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7064).
106. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 166-67. The Supreme Court has "referred often" to the
advisory committee's notes "in interpreting the Rules of evidence... ." Williamson v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2442 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988); Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179 n.2 (1987); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45,51 (1984)).
107. See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
108. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 168.
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afford to lay and expert opinion testimony.1" Additionally, interpret-
ing the Rule to encompass opinions and conclusions avoids the necessity
to resolve conflicts over whether a particular statement in a report is a
fact or an opinion, often a frustrating and elusive endeavor.n
The Fifth Circuit's decision in McQuaig v. McCoy' serves to
illustrate the impact of Beech Aircraft in § 1983 actions. McQuaig grew
out of the arrest of the plaintiffs, Jacque and Linda McQuaig. Following
his arrest, Jacque McQuaig filed a complaint with the state police. The
state police department's internal affairs section conducted an investiga-
tion that culminated in a report describing the events surrounding the
arrest. The report was based upon interviews with the McQuaigs, with
a friend who was with them at the time of the arrest, and with arresting
officer McCoy. The report described the events in question based upon
the investigation, and concluded that "McCoy was capricious and
prejudicial in his arrest of McQuaig, but they could not totally substanti-
ate the allegation of 'false arrest' and therefore did not sustain it.""12
The Fifth Circuit in 1987, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Beech
Aircraft, ruled that because Rule 803(8)(C) is limited to factual findings,
the district court properly admitted only the findings of fact in the
report, not the evaluative conclusions or opinions. Under Beech
Aircraft, this position is no longer valid.
The Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft stated that it was not resolving
whether the Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay exception covers legal conclusions
in an investigatory report.113 The weight of authority is that it does
not."' The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "[Ilegal conclusions are
inadmissible because the jury would have no way of knowing whether
the preparer of the report was cognizant of the requirements underlying
the legal conclusion and, if not, whether the preparer might have a
higher or lower standard than the law requires."' 5 At the same time,
109. Id. at 169. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786,2794
(1993) (citing Beech Aircraft).
110. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 169.
111. 806 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 1300.
113. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 170 n.13.
114. See Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, 886 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Plywood
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1184 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 296, at
290 n.8.
115. Hines, 886 F.2d at 303. See also Musselman-Brown, supra note 16, at 983 n.59
(legal conclusions are "outside an investigator's area of expertise and therefore untrustwor-
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however, the court cautioned that the line between "factual" and "legal"
conclusions in this context, as in others, is often "amorphous.""' 6
It is also unclear whether an investigatory report containing opinions
or conclusions is admissible if it does not also contain findings of fact.
It will be recalled that the report in Beech Aircraft contained both
findings of fact and opinions. Then, too, the language of Rule 803(8)(C)
refers to investigatory reports "setting forth... factual findings. .. "
This would seem to support the position that to be admissible, the report
must contain findings of fact. Likewise, the Court's statement in Beech
Aircraft states that "[a]s long as the conclusion is based on a factual
investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it
should be admissible along with other portions of the report.""' 7 On
the other hand, the Court in Beech Aircraft stated at one point that Rule
803(8)(C) "does not create a distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion'
contained in such [investigatory] reports""" and, later, that "[o]ur
conclusion that neither the language of the Rule nor the intent of its
framers calls for a distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion' is strength-
ened by the analytical difficulty of drawing such a line."119  These
statements in the Court's opinion arguably support the conclusion that
fact-based opinions and conclusions may be admissible even if the report
does not actually contain findings of fact. Under this reading of Beech
Aircraft, the opinions and conclusions need only be fact-based.
C. Underlying Data
Another unresolved issue is whether the Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay
exception is limited to the findings, opinions, and conclusions in
investigatory reports, or whether it also encompasses the underlying
thy").
116. Hines, 886 F.2d at 303. See generally Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985)
(federal habeas corpus; referring to difficulties in determining if issue is of law, fact, or mixed
question of law and fact); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (appellate
review; Supreme Court has not formulated a "rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish
a factual finding from a legal conclusion").
117. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit's decision in
Miller v. Field, 35 F.3d 1088 (6th Cir. 1994), a § 1983 action, appears to support a reading of
Beech Aircraft that the report must contain certain findings of fact. In Miller, the court ruled
that while Beech Aircraft sanctions the inclusion of evaluations and opinions, the "'report
must first be a set of 'factual findings."' Id. at 1091 (quoting Bright v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19,22 (6th Cir. 1984)). For an analysis of Miller v. Field, see infra notes
126-43 and accompanying text.
118. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 164.
119. Id. at 168.
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data, information, and other materials relied upon by the agency. The
prevailing view is that the 803(8)(C) exception covers only the findings,
opinions, and conclusions, not the underlying data."2 To hold other-
wise would allow a great deal of otherwise unreliable inadmissible
hearsay to come before the trier of fact. There may, however, be some
other basis for admitting the underlying data, such as another hearsay
exception."' Some commentators have suggested that the underlying
data should be admitted if it meets the Rule 703 standard for material
or data upon which an expert opinion may be based, namely that it is
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions," even though inadmissible in evidence."2 It is worth
observing that Rule 703 does not authorize the actual admission of the
data and materials underlying an expert opinion, but only establishes the
permissible bases of expert opinions." Finally, there is authority that
even if the underlying data does not meet a specific hearsay exception
it may be admitted, not for its truth, but to show that its existence
provided the basis for the agency's findings and conclusions."
Regardless of which of these theories is invoked, the district court
should, under Rule 403, carefully evaluate whether the probative value
120. Miller v. Field, 35 F.3d 1088 (6th Cir. 1994) (§ 1983 action: bulk of reports consisted
of inadmissible hearsay statements of the parties); Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate, 933 F.2d 1300,
1304-10 (5th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Sierra Nevada Memorial Miners Hosp., 849 F.2d 1186, 1190
(9th Cir. 1988) (assumption that agency's findings are trustworthy "has substantially
diminished force when extended to the sources outside the investigative agency from which
the agency culls the information for its report"); McClure v. Mexia Indep. Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d
396 (5th Cir. 1985) (while admission of EEOC finding of probable cause was proper, trial
court erred in admitting the entire EEOC report, which contained various hearsay statements
including newspaper articles); McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1981); John
McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
470 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1979). See contra In re Air Crash Disaster, 586 F. Supp. 711
(E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
121. See Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1979); WEISSEN-
BERGER, supra note 24, § 803.44, at 433. It has been suggested that much of the underlying
data will be admissible on this basis because of (1) the Federal Rules of Evidence expansive
definition of vicarious admissions, FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(c)(d); and (2) the likelihood that
some other hearsay exception will, in fact, apply, such as present sense impression, statements
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, or declarations against interest. See WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, § 803(8)[03].
122. See GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 803.8, at 906. See also WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 36, at 803-48.
123. See GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 703.1.
124. See Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
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of the underlying data is substantially outweighed by its danger to create
unfair prejudice or to confuse or mislead the trier-of-fact.11
The Sixth Circuit dealt with the underlying data, as well as other
investigatory report issues, in a § 1983 case, Miller v. Field." In that
case, Miller alleged "that while incarcerated in a Michigan penal
institution, he was raped by another inmate."' 27 He claimed that the
defendant prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety
because they ignored threats of assault against him. At issue on appeal
was the propriety of the district court's admission, over the plaintiff's
objections, of investigatory reports of the Michigan State Police of the
rape charge. The first report "consisted of a short summary of
interviews by the reporting [corrections] officer of four... inmates who,
Miller alleged, had witnessed the assault."'" All four prisoners denied
any knowledge of the assault. The second report summarized the
plaintiff's version of the event, while the third summarized an interview
with the prosecutor. "It contained information that the alleged
perpetrators ... would not be charged ... because of the 'lack of
credibility of the victim' and because there was no evidence available to
corroborate the victim's allegations."129
In an opinion taking an especially negative view of investigatory
reports, the circuit court ruled that most of the reports should have been
excluded on hearsay grounds, and that their admission was reversible
error. The court's decision is based upon three analytically distinct,
though related, grounds. First, the court, while acknowledging that
investigatory reports admitted under Rule 803(8)(C) may contain
opinions and evaluations, ruled that they must contain factual find-
ings.1 0 Furthermore, these factual findings must "be based upon the
knowledge or observations of the preparer of the report."13' The court
relied in part upon the statement in the advisory committee's note to
Rule 803(8)(C) that "'[p]olice reports have generally been excluded
except to the extent to which they incorporate firsthand observations of the
officer."'"3  Although some of the information in the reports was
based upon personal knowledge, e.g., that certain interviews took place
125. See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
126. 35 F.3d 1088 (6th Cir. 1994).
127. Id. at 1088.
128. Id. at 1089.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
131. Miller, 35 F.3d at 1091.
132. Id. at 1091 (emphasis in original).
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and that the local prosecutor elected not to press charges, most of the
report was not "part of any factual finding made through firsthand
observation.' ' 33 "[T]he statements of the victim, the alleged assailants,
and various witnesses ... [and] statements by the prosecutor regarding
reasons for not pursuing criminal charges ... contained hearsay
information, not facts observed by the preparer of the police re-port. ,,134
This part of the court's analysis is seriously flawed. Investigations by
their nature involve the gathering of information from numerous
sources, including from third persons. Further, the statement in the
advisory committee's note relied upon by the Miller court referred to the
state of the decisional law prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence; it was not an indication of how Rule 803(8)(C) should be
interpreted. Unlike Rule 803(8)(B) which specifically refers to "matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law[,]" subdivision (C) requires
only that the report contain "factual findings resulting from an
investigation.... " A requirement that the preparer of an investigatory
report must have personal knowledge would come close to obliterating
the efficacy of Rule 803(8)(C). The Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay exception
contemplates that the findings will be based upon "multiple layers of
hearsay ....135
The Miller court, however, also couched its ruling in trustworthiness
terms. It quoted United States v. Paducah Towing Co. for the proposi-
tion "'that factual findings, which are based on inadmissible hearsay, are
not admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) because the underlying information
is untrustworthy." ' 136  This seems far too broad. The critical issue
under Rule 803(8)(C) is not whether the factual findings are based upon
admissible evidence, but whether "the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."'37 The fact that the
findings are based in part, or even largely upon, inadmissible hearsay
should not automatically lead to the conclusion that the findings are
untrustworthy. Indeed, Rule 803(8)(C) presumes that governmental
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, § 8.47, at 976. See Moss v. Ole S. Real
Estate, 933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991).
136. Miller, 35 F.3d at 1091 (quoting United States v. Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412,
420-21 (6th Cir. 1982)).
137. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
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investigatory reports are trustworthy and places the burden upon the
party opposing admission to show otherwise. 3 8
The Miller court was on much firmer ground when it focused upon
the actual contents of the reports. It found that the "bulk" of the
reports did not contain findings, conclusions, or opinions, but was
"largely a recitation of statements of other individuals that fall under no
other exception to the hearsay rule." '139 The statements of the victim's
alleged assailants, other witnesses, and the prosecutor were "hearsay
within hearsay" that should not have been placed before the jury."4
This conclusion seems correct. Rule 803(8)(C) authorizes the admission
of investigatory reports containing "factual findings," not otherwise
inadmissible underlying data.'4
The circuit court in Miller concluded that "only those portions of the
reports that constituted either factual findings resulting from the
firsthand knowledge of the report's preparer or opinions and conclusions
derived from those facts should have been admitted into evidence."'4
Because the reports were admitted for their truth, to show that the
sexual assault did not occur but was fabricated, 43 the error was
prejudicial calling for a new trial. Although some of the circuit court's
reasons for finding the bulk of reports inadmissible are highly question-
able, the court's ruling, that Rule 803(8)(C) does not authorize the
wholesale admission of all the inadmissible data and information
underlying the findings and conclusions in an investigatory report, seems
correct.
D. Trustworthiness
In the great majority of federal court § 1983 actions where admissi-
bility of an investigatory report is at issue, the report's trustworthiness
is the single most important issue. The Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay
exception has an escape hatch: even if an investigatory report satisfies
the Rule's requisites that it contain "factual findings" resulting from an
138. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
139. Miller, 35 F.3d at 1092.
140. Id.
141. The court found that the report did not satisfy the Rule 803(24) residual exception
because it did not provide "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as out-of-
court statements that come within a specific exception. Id.
142. Id. at 1093.
143. The court distinguished its unpublished opinion in Roland v. Johnson, 933 F.2d
1009 (6th Cir. 1991) where the police reports were not introduced for their truth but to show
that the prison official knew about threats of homosexual violence.
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"investigation" carried out pursuant to legal authority, the district court
may exclude it when "the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness." However, because it is assumed that
public officials perform their duties properly, investigatory reports
encompassed within Rule 803(8)(C) are presumed to be trustworthy.
The burden is thus placed upon the party opposing the admissibility of
the report to demonstrate its lack of reliability.144 The advisory
committee's note to Rule 803(8)(C) sets forth a "non-exclusive list of
four factors"'45 that should be considered in evaluating the report's
trustworthiness:
(1) the timeliness of the investigation;
(2) the special skills or experience of the official;
(3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which
conducted; and
(4) possible motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hoff-
man.
The federal courts, both generally and in § 1983 actions specifically,
place heavy reliance upon these four methodological factors in
evaluating the trustworthiness of investigatory reports. 4 7 This makes
sense, not just because these are the factors specifically articulated in the
advisory committee's note, but also because these factors are highly
relevant in assessing trustworthiness. The timeliness of the investigation
is highly pertinent because investigations that take place relatively close
in time to the incidents in question are generally more likely to produce
144. For § 1983 examples, see Miller v. Field, 35 F.3d 1088,1090 (6th Cir. 1994); Montiel
v. City of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1993); Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142
(2d Cir. 1991); Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Johnson v. City
of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Versaint, 849 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.
1988); Bradford Trust Co. of Boston v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 805 F.2d 49
(2d Cir. 1986); Ellis v. International Playtex, 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Japanese
Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S.
574 (1986); In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F,2d 412 (6th Cir. 1982); Robbins v. Whelan, 653
F.2d 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory
committee's note.
Because Rule 803(8)(C) presumes trustworthiness, the district court need not make an
explicit finding of trustworthiness. Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland v. PanAmerica World
Airways, 37 F.3d 804, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1994).
145. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 n.1l (1988).
146. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note (citations omitted). The
reference to Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) is discussed later in the text. See infra
notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 187-210 and accompanying text (§ 1983 applications).
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reports of greater reliability."4 The reason for this is rather apparent.
As Judge Weinstein stated in a significant § 1983 decision, "it is
important to interview witnesses before memories fade and to inspect
physical evidence before it is affected by the passage of time or by
tampering."' 4 9 On the other hand, where "the report is the result of a
study or particularly where ... the investigators depend heavily upon
documents, the passage of time does not appreciably detract from
reliability."""
The importance of the special skills or experience of the investigators
who conducted the investigation is also self-evident. This factor requires
an inquiry into the background and experience of the investigators. For
example, in finding that the report issued by the New York State
Temporary Commission of Investigation concerning the Suffolk County
Police Department and District Attorney's Office was reliable, Judge
Weinstein relied upon the facts that the Commission was chaired by a
former United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York
who was presently the dean of a law school, that the other five
commissioners were lawyers, and that "[k]ey members of the staff were
lawyers With extensive experience in criminal law enforcement."''
With respect to the procedures employed, Rule 803(8)(C) does not
require that a public or other hearing be held. However, whether the
agency conducted a hearing as part of its investigation is a pertinent
consideration in evaluating the report's trustworthiness.' 2 When a
hearing is held, there is no requirement that it be adjudicatory in
nature."5 3 Because most investigations are carried out without an
evidentiary hearing, "[r]equiring that the government report of an
investigation be based on an evidentiary hearing providing an opportuni-
148. For § 1983 examples, see Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986) (report
prepared approximately five weeks after incident in question; report admitted); Wilson v.
Beebe, 743 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1984) (report prepared within one week after incident; report
admitted), vacated on other grounds, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Anderson v. City
of N.Y., 657 F. Supp. 1571, 1578-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (unclear how to evaluate timeliness
factor) see infra note 205.
149. Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435,450 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 926 F.2d
142 (2d Cir. 1991).
150. Id. See also Ellis v. International Playtex, 745 F.2d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 1984).
151. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 452. Cf. Anderson v. City of N.Y., 657 F. Supp. 1571, 1579
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (special skill or experience found "problematic").
152. See In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1989); Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650 (D. Nev.
1982).
153. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 455.
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ty for cross-examination would rob Rule 803(8)(C) of any practical
utility.,,W54
The advisory committee's citation to the Supreme Court's decision
in Palmer v. Hoffman.. suggests that the possible motivational
problems it had in mind were primarily those stemming from reports
prepared in anticipation of litigation. The Palmer decision, which
upheld the exclusion of an accident report prepared by the train
engineer, is best explained on the ground that the report was prepared
with an eye toward litigation.156  Because of this, the Second Circuit
in Palmer had found that the engineer's report was "dripping with
motivations to misrepresent."'5 7
There may, however, be other types of motivational problems. In
some cases courts have found that political bias or motivation was a
significant factor in the evaluation of trustworthiness.'58 In Anderson
v. City of New York,'59 a § 1983 action, the district court, in excluding
a congressional subcommittee report on police misconduct as untrust-
worthy, found that "[o]bviously the 'witnesses' at these hearings were
self-interested in their testimony" and that these types of legislative
hearings and reports "are frequently marred by political expediency and
grandstanding." In contrast, in finding the investigatory report of the
New York State Temporary Commission of Investigation on police and
prosecutorial misconduct to be trustworthy, Judge Weinstein in Gentile
v. County of Suffolk'" relied upon "[t]he nonpartisan make-up of the
Commission."
Bias can result for other reasons as well. In Lewis v. Velez16' the
district court, in a prisoner excessive force case, excluded an investigato-
ry report prepared by corrections officers as untrustworthy. The report
154. In re Japanese Elecs. Prods., 723 F.2d at 268.
155. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
156. 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 288; FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
157. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), affid, 318 U.S. 109 (1943),
quoted in FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory's committee note.
158. See Baker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 793 F.2d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 1986)
(report of congressional subcommittee concerning Firestone 500 tires excluded because it did
not contain "factual findings necessary to an objective investigation, but consisted of the
rather heated conclusions of a politically motivated hearing"); Anderson v. City of N.Y., 657
F. Supp. 1571, 1579 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (witnesses at subcommittee on police misconduct were
"self-interested in their testimony").
159. Anderson, 657 F. Supp. at 1579. See also discussion accompanying notes 202-06.
160. 129 F.R.D. 435, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991). Gentile
is discussed in detail in the text below.
161. 149 F.R.D. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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incorporated statements from the corrections officers involved in the
incident. These officers were obviously biased because their jobs were
at stake and because they faced potential civil and criminal liability.62 .
Whatever the possible source of bias, ultimately the district court must
determine whether the investigatory body had "[a] neutral and objective
stance .... ""
E. Other Trustworthiness Factors
Although the four trustworthiness factors articulated in the advisory
committee's note to Rule 803(8)(C) are the most significant ones, they
are not the only pertinent considerations. The advisory committee
recognized this. After describing the four factors "which may be of
assistance" in evaluating trustworthiness, the committee acknowledged
that "[o]thers no doubt could be added."'"
In his district court decision in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electrical Co., Judge Becker extensively analyzed the trustworthiness
issue and identified seven other pertinent factors in addition to the four
articulated by the advisory committee: (1) the finality of the agency's
findings and the likelihood of modification or reversal; (2) the extent to
which the agency's findings are based upon inadmissible or biased
evidence; (3) if a hearing was held, the procedural safeguards utilized;
(4) "[t]he extent to which there is an ascertainable record on which the
findings are based;"' 66 (5) the extent to which the findings represent
an attempt to implement agency or other governmental policy; (6) "[t]he
extent to which the findings are based upon findings of another
investigative body or tribunal which is itself vulnerable as the result of
trustworthiness evaluation;" 67 and (7) where the report contains an
expert opinion, "the extent to which the facts or data upon which the
opinion is based are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field."' 68 However, "[a]lthough there may be many reasons
162. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
163. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, § 850, at 991.
164. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note. See also Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 n.11 (1988) (referring to the advisory committee's "nonexclusive
list of four factors" for assessing trustworthiness); In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
165. 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
166. Id. at 1147.
167. Id.
168. Id. See also Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate, 933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991).
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
for finding a report untrustworthy, it is clear that the inability of the
defense to cross-examine the author on the conclusions in the report is
not a reason for the exclusion." '169
Although on appeal the Third Circuit did not actually "endorse the
seven [additional] specific criteria," it did not reject them and agreed
that trial courts are not "restricted to the four factors listed by the
Advisory Committee."'7 Furthermore, the circuit court made several
important rulings concerning the trustworthiness evaluation: (1) The
court agreed with the district court that the lack of cross-examination is
not a reason for exclusion. Since "[m]ost governmental investigations
proceed without either evidentiary hearings or the opportunity for cross-
examination," a requirement that investigatory reports be based upon
an "evidentiary hearing providing an opportunity for cross-examination
would rob Rule 803(8)(C) of any practical utility.'.' "The indicia of
reliability for the governmental investigative report is the fact that it is
prepared pursuant to a duty imposed by law."'7 (2) The fact that the
author of the report was absent from the hearings and relied upon the
reports of other officials did not make the findings unreliable because
governmental officials often must rely upon staff reports of the
hearings. 73 (3) "If the government in conducting investigations
pursuant to authority granted by law, is authorized to rely and does rely
on confidential submissions in making a finding, that fact does not so
impugn the trustworthiness of the finding as to make it inadmissi-
ble."' 74  (4) Rule 803(8)(C) encompasses "accusatory" investigatory
proceedings.7  (5) The fact that an investigatory finding is subject to
The seven additional Zenith Radio factors were endorsed in Escrow Disbursement Ins.
Agency v. American Title and Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Fla. 1982). But see Masemer
v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Del. 1989) (declining to apply
the seven additional factors).
169. Distaff, Inc. v. Springfield Contracting Corp., 984 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1993). But
see WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, § 8.03(7)[011, at 803 - 256-257 (where trustworthi-
ness of the report is problematical, trial court may exclude report unless the reporting officer
is produced for cross-examination).
170. In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238,265 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1989).
171. Id. at 268.
172. Id.
173. Id. ("In the real world of governmental affairs, investigations into economic facts
... will frequently require that the expert to whom the agency entrusts the task of making
a finding rely on facts not directly observed by him."). Accord Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate,
933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991).
174. 723 F.2d at 270-71.
175. Id. at 273.
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possible judicial review "does not support an inference that the
investigation was unreliable or the finding based upon it untrustwor-
thy."' 6 and (6) A recommended investigatory decision may be trust-
worthy, even if it is superseded by a consent decree.1
77
Of the seven additional trustworthiness factors identified by the
district court in Zenith Radio, the federal courts have paid the most
attention to "finality." The prevailing view is that, although lack of
finality is a pertinent consideration in evaluating the trustworthiness of
the report, finality is not an absolute requisite of admissibility.78 On
the other hand, a number of decisions have relied upon the lack of
finality to support the conclusion that either the report does not contain
"factual findings" or that, even if it does, it is untrustworthy.7 9 In the
176. Id. at 268-69.
177. The court stated: "That the recommended decision was superseded by the Consent
Decree is irrelevant, since the Consent Decree in no sense rejects the findings in the
recommended decision. The recommended decision unquestionably is sufficiently trustworthy
for admission under Rule 803(8)(C). The congruence between the Recommendation, the
draft recommended decision and the Consent Decree is strong circumstantial evidence that
the staff investigation was thorough." Id. at 274.
178. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) (tentative
findings may be admissible); In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1983) (lack of finality did not render report untrustworthy), rev'd on other grounds, 475
U.S. 574 (1986); United States v. School Dist., 577 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1978) (fact that agency
proceeding was not complete did not mean report was not trustworthy); Gentile v. County
of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (finality is not a sine qua non because "[i]n
many instances non-final reports may be extremely useful and reliable as far as they go. But
certainly finality is a consideration favoring admission."), aff'd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
The fact that judicial review is available "does not support an inference that the investiga-
tion was unreliable or the finding based upon it untrustworthy." In re Japanese Elecs. Prods.,
723 F.2d at 268-69.
179. See Toole v. McClintock, 999 F.2d 1430,1434-35 (11th Cir. 1993) (report containing
only "proposed findings" not within Rule 803(8)(C): "Rule 803 makes no [hearsay] exception
for tentative or interim reports subject to revision and review"); United States v. Gray, 852
F.2d 136,139 (4th Cir. 1988) (district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding report that
was "only a tentative internal report not purporting to contain agency factual findings");
Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1140 (5th Cir. 1983) ("If the document is not
sufficiently final, it may not constitute a 'factual finding,' or may be considered untrustworthy
.... "); City of N.Y. v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1981) ("As an interim
report subject to revision and review, the report did not satisfy the express requirement of the
Rule that the proffered evidence must constitute the 'findings' of an agency or official." The
report's "broad language did not embody the findings of an agency, but the tentative results
of an incomplete staff investigation."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
In Skorupski v. County of Suffolk, 652 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), a § 1983 case, the
court held a noncompleted report inadmissible on hearsay and relevance grounds. At the
time of trial, the Commission had compiled data and the investigation was still ongoing. "No
specifics or results, however, have been provided by plaintiff regarding either the scope or
focus of this investigation ... and, at all events, such investigation is inadmissible hearsay
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author's view, lack of finality should be considered a pertinent, not
dispositive, trustworthiness factor. The critical inquiry should be the
impact of the lack of finality upon the report's trustworthiness. There
are still other important trustworthiness considerations: whether the
investigatory body acted with care and sound methodology, pursued all
relevant leads, interviewed all pertinent witnesses, considered all
relevant information, employed "checking procedures that might catch
mistakes," and subjected evaluative reports to peer review.1"
As the above discussion demonstrates, trustworthiness focuses upon
the methodology of the investigation, not on whether the findings and
conclusions are complete and accurate.'81 So long as the trial judge
finds that reasonable jurors could accept the findings and conclusions in
the report, it may not be excluded on the grounds that the findings and
conclusions are incomplete, inaccurate, or not credible."s These issues
go to the weight the trier-of-fact may give to the report.
Given the numerous factors that may affect the trustworthiness
determination, it is understandable that the district courts have broad
discretion in this regard."m Further discretionary power to admit or
exclude is found in Rule 403.1's The Fifth Circuit has cautioned,
however, that "Rule 403 should not be misused in such a way that
'would end the presumption that evaluative reports are admissible
hearsay under Rule 803(8)(C)."' 185 Trustworthiness determinations
are generally reviewed on appeal under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard.
86
evidence in this case." Id. at 695.
180. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, § 850, at 992-93.
181. Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate, 933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991).
182. Id.
183. See City of N.Y. v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1164 (1982).
184. See supra notes 211-37 and accompanying text.
185. Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1992).
186. Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); Perrin v. Anderson, 784
F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986); City of N.Y. v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982). In In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238
(3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 564 (1986), the circuit court refined the
standard of appellate review over the trustworthiness determination: (1) when the trial court
makes Rule 104(a) findings of fact about the manner in which the report was prepared, the
clearly erroneous standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 governs on appeal; (2) if the determination
of untrustworthiness was predicated on factors that are extraneous to the trustworthiness
determination, this is an error of law reviewed de novo. See also Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate,
933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991).
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E Applications in § 1983 Actions
The trustworthiness of investigatory reports has been at issue in
several reported § 1983 decisions. These reports have been proffered in
some cases on the issue of personal liability and in others on municipal
liability. In some cases, the plaintiff sought to introduce the report, and
in others the defendant.
In Wilson v. Beebe,"8' the plaintiff alleged that while being hand-
cuffed he was shot by State Trooper Beebe. The Sixth Circuit ruled that
the district court did not commit error in allowing the plaintiff to
introduce into evidence an investigatory report prepared by Beebe's
district commander, Captain MacGregor. The report detailed the events
that led to the shooting and contained a statement by Captain Mac-
Gregor that Trooper "Beebe, by attempting to handcuff [the plaintiff]
while holding a cocked weapon, acted contrary to department training
in weapons use and handling.' 188
It is not difficult to understand why the plaintiff wanted to introduce
this report. It was highly probative on the personal liability of Officer
Beebe. Relying on the four factors set forth in the advisory committee's
note to Rule 803(8)(C), the circuit court found that the report was
sufficiently trustworthy. It was written by Captain MacGregor within
one week of the incident; it was prepared for interdepartmental use;
MacGregor was previously a firearms instructor in the police department
and was thus familiar with its training procedures and policies; there
were no motivational problems; and no evidence was "presented which
impugned the memorandum's trustworthiness."'189
In Perrin v. Anderson,90 it was the defendant officers who intro-
duced the investigatory report into evidence. The complaint in Perrin
alleged that two members of the State Highway Patrol killed the
deceased in violation of his constitutional rights. Following the incident,
a board consisting of five members of the state police was convened
under the auspices of the State Department of Public Safety to
investigate the matter. The board, after interviewing the two defendant
police officers and their superiors, issued a report finding that there was
"no doubt that [Officer Anderson] acted within the guidelines set forth
187. 743 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985)
(en banc).
188. Id. at 346.
189. Id. at 347.
190. 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986).
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in the Policies and Procedures Manual."'91 The Tenth Circuit found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
defendants to introduce the report into evidence. The fact that the
report was prepared pursuant to lawful authority helped to ensure its
reliability."9 Furthermore, it was found trustworthy because it was
prepared approximately five weeks after the incident and by high-
ranking officers; hearings, although not adversarial, were held; and there
were no motivational problems. The court refused to assume that an
internal investigation is necessarily biased: "That an investigation was
conducted internally should affect the weight to be given the report, not
its admissibility." 93 The plaintiff in Perrin failed to offer "convincing
evidence" that the report was not trustworthy.
The investigatory reports in Wilson and Perrin were relevant on the
issue of the defendant officers' personal liability. Findings and
conclusions in investigatory reports have also been introduced on the
issue of municipal liability. The leading case is Gentile v. County of
Suffolk.194 In Gentile, the plaintiffs sought relief against individual
police officers and the county. The plaintiffs alleged that the Suffolk
County Police Department and District Attorney's Office were refusing
to seriously investigate police and prosecutorial misconduct. Judge
Weinstein's district court opinion contains a comprehensive analysis of
most of the evidentiary aspects of investigatory reports, including their
trustworthiness.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit upheld Judge Weinstein's admission
of portions of the Report of the New York State Temporary Commission
of Investigation of the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office and
Police Department, the so-called SIC Report. The report concluded that
theses offices tolerated and ratified police and prosecutorial misconduct.
In finding the SIC Report trustworthy, Judge Weinstein considered the
timeliness of the investigation, the special skills, experience, and
expertise of the investigators, the procedures employed, the nonpartisan
makeup of the Commission, which belied charges of bias, and the
report's finality. Significantly, Judge Weinstein found that, given the
evidentiary difficulties in proving a municipal custom or practice,
admitting the report furthered the policies of § 1983:
191. Id. at 1046.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1047. Cautionary instructions were given in Perrin. See infra notes 231-37
and accompanying text.
194. 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y 1990), affd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Avoidance of undue delay is of particular importance in civil
rights cases brought against municipalities under § 1983. Were
reports such as the SIC Report to be excluded, plaintiffs would
be forced to introduce proof of innumerable individual incidents
of police and prosecutorial misconduct in order to show that a
municipal practice, policy or custom existed. This would make
it difficult, if not impossible, for many deserving plaintiffs to
prevail, thereby frustrating federal civil rights policy .... "'
This is an important point deserving amplification. There are rarely
factual issues when a municipal policy is embodied in a formally
promulgated ordinance, regulation, or policy statement or the final
decision of a municipal policymaker.'96 By contrast, sharp factual
issues are often present when the municipal liability claim is premised
upon an alleged custom or practice. The parties may well find it
necessary to conduct broad discovery and their own investigations. To
prove a custom or practice, the plaintiff's counsel will normally find it
necessary to weave together numerous individual pieces of circumstantial
evidence, including the testimony of many witnesses.19 7 This can, as
Judge Weinstein observed, be very time consuming and costly.
However, if the government carried out an investigation of a systemic
problem and issued an investigatory report finding that the particular
unlawful practice existed, the government may, in effect, have done the
factual work-up for the plaintiff. The report, if admissible, may be
highly probative proof of the alleged practice. In this context, it
becomes a type of "large size economy measure."
Of course, the defendants must be protected against unfair prejudice.
In Gentile, Judge Weinstein developed procedures specifically designed
to prevent unfair prejudice to the defendants. The entire report was not
introduced. Rather, each side was allowed to select a few findings to
read to the jury. By refusing to admit the report itself into evidence, the
district court limited the possible unfair prejudice from its being "taken
into the jury room where it might continue to speak."' 98 Further, both
the parties and the district court stressed in instructions that because the
195. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 459.
196. The Supreme Court has resolved that whether an official is a municipal
policymaker is a question of law for the court. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,
739 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469 (1986).
197. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§§ 12.4-12.5 (2d ed. 1995).
198. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 461.
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SIC Report did not contain any findings with respect to the individual
officer defendants, it was relevant only with respect to the municipal
liability claim against the county.
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that Judge Weinstein did not
abuse his discretion in admitting the portions of the SIC Report.' 99
The report was relevant on the question of municipal liability because,
as the district court found, it "supports plaintiffs' allegation that the
police and the District Attorney's Office were likely because of a course
of conduct to consistently ignore evidence of misconduct on the part of
the defendant officers and to sanction and cover up any wrongdoing
connected with the ... investigation [involving the plaintiffs].""
Furthermore, the circuit court ruled that Judge Weinstein did not abuse
his discretion in finding the report to be trustworthy and in finding that
the defendants did not meet their burden of showing otherwise.
The defendants in Gentile also challenged Judge Weinstein's
procedures for determining the trustworthiness of the report. They
argued that the district court erred in admitting the report at trial and
delaying the hearing on trustworthiness until the post-trial stage. The
circuit court rejected this contention. Although it is true that Judge
Weinstein delayed the hearing on trustworthiness until the post-trial
stage, he had found the SIC Report to be trustworthy before admitting
it. Further, the defendants' request for an earlier hearing, made on the
third day of trial, was untimely. Given the fact that a party does not
have a legal right to a hearing to resolve questions of admissibility of
evidence, the post-trial hearing actually gave the defendants more
process than they were entitled to when contesting the evidentiary issue.
Although it is somewhat unusual to admit evidence at trial and hold a
post-trial hearing on its admissibility, under the particular circumstances
there was no abuse of discretion. 20
1
199. 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
200. 129 F.R.D. at 446.
201. The circuit court in Gentile also found that Judge Weinstein properly distinguished
Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989), a § 1983 case in which the circuit court upheld
the exclusion of the same State Temporary Commission of Investigation report on the ground
that the plaintiff there failed to show its relevance to the case at hand and, indeed, neither
produced a copy of the report for the district court nor made an offer of proof of its relevant
portions. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
In a post-Gentile case, Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1991), the Second Circuit suggested that the hearsay problem involving the admissibility of
investigatory reports might be avoided if the report was not admitted for the truth of its
contests, but only for the fact that the report was made, which could be relevant on the issue
of whether the municipal policy makers were on notice of repeated failures to investigate
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It is instructive to contrast the finding of trustworthiness in Gentile
with the finding of untrustworthiness in Anderson v. City of New
York'3 2 In Anderson, the plaintiff, a black male, alleged that officers
of the New York City Police Department used excessive force ("physical
violence") while arresting him. He alleged that this violence, "as well
as the arrest and prosecution itself were manifestations of a [city] policy
of civil rights deprivations against racial minorities ... ."2 In support
of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought to rely upon
a congressional report entitled the Report on Hearings in New York City
on Police Misconduct by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. The
report was based on two public hearings at which testimony was given
by civilians alleging police misconduct, police officers, former New York
City Mayor Koch, and by the City Police Commissioner. "The [R]eport,
summarizing these hearings, is an indictment of a system seen as
encouraging-through failures of supervision, training and discipline-a
pattern of illegal arrest, harassment, foul language and racial slurs, and
brutality, aimed at minorities by white police officers."'
The court found that the report was not sufficiently trustworthy to
meet the Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay exception for investigatory reports. Its
reliability was undercut by the facts that the subcommittee members
lacked personal knowledge of the events about which the witnesses
testified, and, moreover, the witnesses were "self-interested in their
testimony."'  The court was generally distrustful of legislative
subcommittee reports, finding them "frequently marred by political
expediency and grandstanding. 206
In Lewis v. Velez,' a prisoner excessive force case, the federal
district court ruled that an investigatory report of the incident in
charges of police use of excessive force.
202. 657 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
203. Id. at 1572.
204. Id. at 1577.
205. Id. at 1579. The court in Anderson found that the timeliness factor was unclear
because, although plaintiff's arrest occurred in 1982 and the hearings took place in 1983 and
covered the period 1979-1983, the "[s]ubcommittee did not investigate or examine, in a timely
manner, reports regarding the instant set of facts and how, if at all, they are related to the
alleged general policy of discrimination." Id.
206. Id. The court in Anderson quoted Knight Pub. Co. v. United States Dep't. of
Justice, 631 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (W.D.N.C. 1986) ("[C]ongressional committee hearings are
oft time[s] conducted in a circus atmosphere, with a gracious plenty of posturing by the politi-
cians for T.V. publicity in large part for benefit of constituents back home .... This 'circus'
is hardly conducive to the development of facts ...
207. 149 F.R.D. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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question, that incorporated statements from the corrections officers
involved, was not trustworthy. The investigator, Captain Bryan, lacked
any training in investigative skills. Furthermore, the corrections officers'
jobs were on the line and they faced potential criminal and civil
liability.' s The court stated that "[a] strong likelihood of improper
motivation ... can outweigh all other trustworthiness factors."' 9
Indeed, the court found that most cases in which investigatory reports
have been excluded present suspicions of bias.210
A finding that a report is trustworthy does not mean that it is
admissible, because it still must clear other hurdles of admissibility,
including the balancing test of Rule 403, exclusionary rules such as that
provided for in Federal Rule of Evidence 407 for subsequent remedial
measures, and governmental privilege. These issues are discussed in the
following sections. Before doing so, however, it should be stressed that
the trustworthiness issue is closely related to the Rule 403 evaluation
because the greater the trustworthiness of the report, the higher its
probative value, and the less likely it will mislead or cause unfair
prejudice.
V. RELEVANCE AND RULE 403; CAUTIONARY INSTRUcIIONS
Even if an investigatory report satisfies the Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay
exception, it must still meet the test of relevance2 11 and the Rule 403
balancing test.212 Given the broad definition of relevance, 13 and the
208. The Lewis court observed that "[a] longstanding awareness that correction officers
may be liable under § 1983 for inmate beatings has been found [by the Seventh Circuit] to
warrant the assumption that 'at least some guards write their reports on such occurrences with
that possibility in mind."' Id. at 489 (quoting Bracey v. Herringa, 466 F.2d 702, 704 (7th Cir.
1972)).
209. d.
210. Id. But see Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994) (bias of persons inter-
viewed did not render report inherently biased).
211. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Under Rule
402, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
212. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
213. Under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, it is enough that the evidence has "any
tendency" to make a fact of consequence more or less probable.
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strong presumption of admissibility under Rule 403,214 these normally
are not significant obstacles. Nevertheless, there are § 1983 cases in
which investigatory reports have been excluded both as irrelevant and
on Rule 403 grounds.
For example, in Kinan v. City of Brockton,215 the plaintiff asserted
§ 1983 claims arising out of his arrest against the City and several of its
police officers. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court
erred in excluding an internal affairs investigatory report of the incident
involving the plaintiff. Two years after the incident, Police Chief Cronin
ordered an in-house investigation, which concluded that the police
officers had acted appropriately and that there was no wrongdoing by
the police department. Although the plaintiff argued that the report
tended to "prove a policy on part of the city of ratification of civil rights
abuses by the police department," '216 the circuit court failed to see its
relevance under the particular circumstances. The court found it
difficult to comprehend how a report finding no wrongdoing by
the police would prove a city policy of ratification of civil rights
abuses. Presumably this no-fault report would become evidence
of condonation of improper police behavior if the jury found,
contrary to the report, that the police officers had in fact violated
plaintiff's civil rights. Since the jury did not make such a finding,
if there was error, it was harmless.7
17
The circuit court also rejected the "convoluted reasoning" of
plaintiff's second argument, namely that excluding the investigatory
report prevented him from proving the Chief of Police's responsibility,
as a policymaker, for the alleged constitutional violation. Cronin was
neither the Chief of Police at the time of the event in question nor a city
policymaker. The circuit court failed "to see how an investigation
ordered by [the police chief] two years after the incident concluding that
there was no police misconduct would be evidence of [the chief's]
liability as a policymaker."21 Thus, the First Circuit upheld the district
court's exclusion of the investigatory report on relevance grounds.
214. See GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 403.1, at 175-76. Under Rule 403, evidence may be
excluded only if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by one or more of the
countervailing factors. See supra note 212.
215. 876 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1989).





The Second Circuit upheld the exclusion of an investigatory report
on relevance grounds in Janetka v. Dabe.219 In Janetka, the plaintiff
alleged § 1983 claims based upon the use of excessive force during his
arrest and malicious prosecution. He sued the arresting officer, Darrell
Dabe, and the County of Suffolk. On appeal, he contested the district
court's refusal to admit an investigatory report of the New York State
Temporary Commission of Investigation, the SIC Report, which
concluded "that Suffolk County tolerated and approved of misconduct
by individual police officers."2" The plaintiff argued that the district
court erred in failing to consider the pertinent trustworthiness factors
under Rule 803(8)(C). The circuit court, however, found that the district
court properly evaluated the relevance of the report before proceeding
to the Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay issue and, furthermore, that the district
court properly found that the plaintiff failed to establish the relevance
of the report. The plaintiff did not even produce a copy of the report
for the district court or make an offer of proof as to its relevant
portions. He also failed to connect Officer Dabe's conduct to a policy
or practice of Suffolk County.
It will be recalled that in Gentile v. County of Suffolk,"' the
Second Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the very
same SIC Report was relevant. Unlike Janetka, however, the plaintiffs
in Gentile produced a copy of the report and demonstrated its relevance
on the issue of municipal liability. The district court in Gentile found
that
[n]ot only does the SIC report tend to establish the existence of
a municipal policy or practice, but it also supports plaintiffs'
allegation that the police and the District Attorney's Office were
likely because of a course of conduct to consistently ignore
evidence of misconduct on the part of the defendant officers and
to sanction and cover up any wrongdoing connected with the
[plaintiffs] Gentile and Rydstrom investigation.2'
Defendants' argument that the SIC Report lacked probative value
because it did not specifically deal with the Gentile and Rydstrom cases
was without merit. The report was relevant because it tended "to
support an inference of an affirmative link between municipal policy and
the type of individual behavior involved here."'2"
219. 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989).
220. Id. at 190.
221. 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
222. Id at 446.
223. Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
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An investigatory report that meets the requirements of the Rule
803(8)(C) hearsay exception and the test of relevance is still subject to
possible exclusion under Rule 403 balancing. It must be kept in mind,
however, that not only does Rule 403 strongly favors admissibility, but
the Rule 803(8)(C) trustworthy determination is also pertinent to the
Rule 403 evaluation because the greater the trustworthiness of the
report, the higher its probative value and the lower the danger to
mislead or cause unfair prejudice. 4 The Fifth Circuit has cautioned
"that the balancing test of Rule 403 should not be misused in such a way
that 'would end the presumption that evaluative reports are admissible
hearsay under Rule 803(8)(C),' that is, that they are presumed
trustworthy.m
Nevertheless, there are § 1983 cases in which investigatory reports
were excluded under Rule 403. For one thing, the availability of
alternative modes of proof may affect the probative value of an
investigatory report. For example, in Swietlowich v. County of
Bucks,2 6 a § 1983 arrestee suicide case, the complaint alleged that the
police officers did not comply with their duty to periodically look in on
prisoners. The district court excluded a district attorney's investigatory
report of alterations of the cell check log, primarily because it doubted
its trustworthiness. The circuit court found that this ruling was not
error, "particularly since most of the information that [the report]
contained could have been obtained from witnesses who were present
in court and who contributed to the investigation."'2 Although the
circuit court did not cite to Rule 403, the existence of alternative
evidence is plainly pertinent to the Rule 403 probative value evaluation,
as well as to such 403 goals as preventing needless cumulative evidence
and waste of time.'
Because of the official character of investigatory reports, courts must
be sensitive about the potential for unfair prejudice to the party against
whom it is introduced.' 9 Steps can be taken to minimize such preju-
224. See In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
225. Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate, Inc., 933 F.2d 1300, 1308 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1992)).
226. 610 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1979).
227. Id. at 1165.
228. See GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 403.1.
229. See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980) (report
excluded because of danger of unfair prejudice); Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435,
460 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff d, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991). See also United States v. MacDonald,
688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982) (exclusion of report upheld because of potential jury confusion),
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dice. As discussed earlier, in Gentile v. County of Suffolk,"0 Judge
Weinstein refused to admit the entire investigatory report into evidence,
but instead allowed the parties to read selected portions of it to the jury.
Further, Judge Weinstein gave the jury detailed limiting instructions
emphasizing that the excerpts "were to be viewed with caution and
considered only with regard to the case against the municipal defendant
provided the jury first found that the individual defendants had violated
plaintiff's constitutional rights.""1  By refusing to admit the report
itself into evidence, the court limited the possible unfair prejudice from
the report being "taken into the jury room where it might continue to
speak." 2 Ultimately, the district court found that, especially because
of its importance on the issue of municipal liability, the SIC Report was
admissible under Rule 403:
The trustworthiness and probative value of the SIC report,
considered in conjunction with the limiting instruction given by
the court, other protections afforded defendants and the opportu-
nity defendants were given to produce evidence in derogation of
the report, adequately protected against the risk that the excerpts
read to the jury may have had an unfair prejudicial effect. Rule
403 does not require the court to exclude the best available
evidence supporting plaintiff's Monell claim.23
On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that Judge Weinstein did not abuse
his discretion under Rule 403.'
Cautionary instructions also played an important role under Rule 403
in Perrin v. Anderson.2 5  There, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
district court did not err in allowing the defendants to introduce an
internal investigatory report finding that the police officer's use of
deadly force was within police department guidelines. The district court
had instructed the jury that this investigatory report resulted from "an
agency hearing of its own personnel and for its own purpose and was to
have no 'determinative effect on any issue in the case."'6 The Tenth
Circuit found that "this cautionary instruction mitigated any prejudice
the report may have had." 7
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).
230. 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
231. Id. at 437.
232. Id. at 461.
233. Id.
234. Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
235. 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986).
236. Id. at 1047.
237. Id.
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VI. APPLYING THE RULE 407 EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR SUBSE-
QUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES TO INVESTIGATORY REPORTS
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 codifies the common law exclusionary
rule for remedial measures taken by an alleged wrongdoer following an
injury-producing event when the evidence is offered on the issue of
liability"38 The advisory committee's note to Rule 407 articulates the
twin rationales for this exclusionary rule. First, there is the relevance
concept that taking a remedial step does not constitute an admission of
prior wrongdoing; it may simply grow out of the lessons of experience
or a present desire for greater care. "Or, as Baron Bromwell put it, the
rule rejects the notion that 'because the world gets wiser as it gets older
therefore it was foolish before."'' 9  Second, the "more impressive"
rationale for the rule is the important public policy "of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in
furtherance of added safety.' 240
The advisory committee's note to Rule 407 provides examples of the
types of remedial measures that may fall within the Rule: "[s]ubsequent
repairs, installation of safety devices, changes in company rules and
discharge of employees ... ." To this may be added, as circuit courts
238. FED. R. EVID. 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id.
239. As the advisory committee's note to Rule 407 recognizes, however, this non-
relevance rationale alone would not support the exclusionary rule because, under the liberal
definition of relevance set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 401, an inference of fault from
the remedial action taken may be permissible.
240. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note. Given the rationale of promoting
remedial measures, it follows that the Rule 407 exclusionary rule should be limited to
voluntary measures undertaken by the party charged with wrongdoing and that are
undertaken after the injury-producing event. Thus, the exclusionary rule does not pertain to
remedial measures compelled by governmental authority, for in these circumstances the policy
of encouraging remedial measures has no role; one cannot be encouraged to do what one is
already compelled to do. In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir.
1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.
1978). Additionally, the rationale behind the exclusionary rule justifies its limitation to
remedial measures undertaken by the party charged with wrongdoing, not by third persons.
2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 267, at 201; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, § 407[a].
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have recognized in § 1983 suits, changes in governmental policies and
priorities, and the conducting of employee disciplinary proceedings.241
The question arises whether a governmental investigation and an
investigatory report constitute remedial measures within the meaning of
Rule 407.242
This issue has arisen in a number of lower federal court decisions,
including several § 1983 actions. The weight of authority draws an
important distinction: although the investigation and investigatory report
are not remedial measures within Rule 407 because they would not have
made the event less likely to occur,243 investigatory report references
to remedial measures that were taken by the party charged with
241. Specht v. Jensen, 863 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) (disciplinary action); Ford v.
Schmidt, 577 F.2d 408 (7th Cir.) (modification of regulations), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870
(1978).
242. Before proceeding to that issue, it should be pointed out that the Rule 407
exclusionary rule applies only when evidence of the remedial measure is used to show liability
("negligence or culpable conduct"). Rule 407 provides that exclusion of the evidence is not
required when it is "offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." The critical
distinction, then, is between evidence of a subsequent remedial measure offered to show
liability, which is within the exclusionary rule, and such evidence offered for some other
relevant controverted purpose "such as" ownership or control, which is not. The use of the
phrase "such as" shows that the listing of potentially permissible uses of remedial measure
evidence is not exclusive, but illustrative of the recurring potentially permissible uses. See 2
STRONG, supra note 36, § 267, at 201. When used for a permissible "other purpose," a
limiting instruction to that effect should be given. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 25, § 407.4,
at 111.
Offering evidence of a remedial measure on a relevant issue other than liability, however,
does not insure its admission into evidence. To be admitted, the issue in question, e.g.,
ownership or control, must be "controverted." Thus, a concession of the issue by the party
against whom the evidence is sought to be introduced (normally the defendant) effectively
shields the evidence from the trier of fact. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
Further, even evidence of a remedial measure that is offered for a controverted non-liability
purpose is subject to possible evaluation under Rule 403. FED. R. EVlD. 407 advisory
committee's note.
243. Prentiss & Carlisle Co. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timberjack, Inc., 972 F.2d
6 (1st Cir. 1992) (non-§ 1983 case); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, 857 F.2d
26 (1st Cir. 1988) (non-§ 1983; diagnostic test report), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989);
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986)
(non-§ 1983); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (§ 1983 action); Westmoreland
v. CBS, 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (non-§ 1983). Contra Alimenta, Inc. v. Stauffer, 598
F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (non-§ 1983). Cf. In re Aircrash, 871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1989)
(report prepared by government without voluntary participation of party charged with
wrongdoing not within Rule 407). Documents prepared under government compulsion are
clearly outside the scope of Rule 407. See Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.
1978) (non-§ 1983).
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wrongdoing are within Rule 407.2 If a report clears the rule against
hearsay, Rule 403, and other admissibility hurdles, and is offered on the
issue of liability, the portions referring to the remedial measures should
be redacted.245
The Tenth Circuit in Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopters
Textron 46 gave a cogent explanation about why investigations, studies,
and reports are not themselves remedial measures under Rule 407. That
diversity jurisdiction case arose out of a fatal helicopter accident. The
case was brought against the manufacturer of the helicopter. In
rejecting the defendant's argument that the post-helicopter accident
study was a remedial measure that should have been excluded, the
circuit court stated:
It would strain the spirit of the remedial measure prohibition in
Rule 407 to extend its shield to evidence contained in post-event
tests or reports. It might be possible in rare situations to
characterize such reports as 'measures' which, if conducted
previously, would reduce the likelihood of the occurrence. Yet
it is usually sounder to recognize that such tests are conducted
for the purpose of investigating the occurrence to discover what
might have gone wrong or right. Remedial measures are those
actions taken to remedy any flaws or failures indicated by the
test. In this case, the remedial measure was not the Photoelastic
Study of the trunnion [i.e., the part of the helicopter connecting
the mast with the rotor blades] but rather the subsequent
redesign of the trunnion .... [R]eferences to redesign were
excluded at trial.
We believe that the policy considerations that underlie Rule
407, such as encouraging remedial measures, are not as vigorous-
ly implicated where investigative tests and reports are concerned.
To the extent that such policy concerns are implicated, they are
outweighed by... the danger of depriving "injured claimants of
one of the best and most accurate sources of evidence and
information."'247
244. O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1990) (non-§ 1983); Maddox v.
City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (§ 1983 action); Masemer v. Delmarva
Power & Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Del. 1989) (non-§ 1983).
245. O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1990) (non-§ 1983); Masemer v.
Delmarva Power & Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Del. 1989) (non-§ 1983). See also Rocky
Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986).
246. 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986).
247. Id. at 918-19 (quoting Westmoreland, 601 F. Supp. at 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). Accord
Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482,487 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (non-§ 1983; "the
policy consideratioris underlying Rule 407 are to some extent implicated in the context of
1996]
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The circuit court in Rocky Mountain thus concluded that the "correct
procedure" is for the results of the report to be communicated to the
trier-of-fact without reference to their "post-event time frame, unless
one of the exceptions to Rule 407 applies.
248
In Wilson v. Beebe, 9 a § 1983 case arising out of a state trooper's
shooting of the plaintiff, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
district court did not commit error in admitting a memorandum written
after the shooting by the trooper's district commander detailing the
events leading to the shooting, and concluding that the trooper acted
contrary to his training in attempting to handcuff the suspect while
holding a cocked weapon. The court reasoned that "[t]he report was an
official inter-office communication required by a standing departmental
order" that met the hearsay exception for public records.' Defen-
dants' argument that the report should have been excluded under Rule
407 had no merit because "[t]he report did not recommend a change in
procedures following the shooting; it was a report of that incident and
nothing more. '"' Wilson, then, is consistent with the philosophy
expressed in Rocky Mountain Helicopters.
Not all courts, however, have taken cognizance of the distinction
between the investigation and investigatory report, on the one hand, and
the resulting remedial measures, on the other. In Maddox v. City of Los
post-event tests, but... it would extend the Rule beyond its intended boundaries to include
such tests within its ambit. Post-event tests will not, in themselves, result in added safety.
Rather, it is only if the defects revealed in those tests are remedied and changes implemented
that the goal of added safety will be furthered. By its terms Rule 407 includes only the actual
remedial measures themselves and not the initial steps toward ascertaining whether any
remedial measures are called for."). The court in Westmoreland rejected the argument that
the internal network report should be excluded because its admission would discourage
"honest self-examination and self-policing." Westmoreland, 601 F. Supp. at 67.
248. Rocky Mountain, 805 F.2d at 919.
249. 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
250. Id. at 590 (referring to FED. R. EVID. 803 (8)(A) and (C)).
251. Wilson, 770 F.2d at 590. See also Bergman v. Kemp, 97 F.R.D. 413 (W.D. Mich.
1983). In Bergman, the plaintiff alleged that the FBI had advance knowledge of a conspiracy
to assault participants in a "Freedom Ride," but failed to prevent the resulting violence.
Defendants sought to exclude evidence of a Task Force Report on the activities of the FBI.
Defendants argued that the Report was within the "critical self-evaluation privilege," but the
court found that privilege largely undefined and, moreover, not generally recognized. See
infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text. With respect to defendants' Rule 407 argument,
the court found that the Report was not a remedial measure because it was not "an indicia
of a change that was made to make an event less likely to occur or to correct a previous
condition," and did not cause any change in FBI procedures regarding the use of informants.
Bergman, 97 F.R.D. at 418.
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Angeles, 2 a deadly force arrest case brought under § 1983, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the district court did not err in excluding the police
officer's admission, during a post-incident departmental disciplinary
proceeding, that he violated city policy regarding the use of chokeholds.
The circuit court found that "[t]he Internal Affairs investigation and
measures taken by the defendant City were remedial measures taken
after the incident. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, evidence
of these proceedings was therefore properly excluded with respect to the
City's liability.",25 3 This analysis is not only conclusory, but imprecise
and partially erroneous. First, the circuit court failed to spell out the
remedial "measures" taken by the City. This is an important point
because Rule 407 does not exclude all post-event evioence, but only that
of a remedial nature. However, even assuming that the measures were
remedial, the court should not have lumped the "investigation,"
"disciplinary proceeding," and "remedial measures" together. An
investigation by itself is not remedial action. The taking of disciplinary
action may be a remedial action, as might other "measures" taken as a
result of an investigation.
In Specht v. Jensen,' a § 1983 action alleging an unconstitutional
search, the Tenth Circuit held that a press release summarizing the result
of the city's investigation of the event in question, and stating "that the
officers involved exercised poor judgment in failing to read the writ of
assistance thoroughly, and that appropriate disciplinary action would be
taken," was properly excluded under Rule 407."5 The circuit court
found that the release "sets out remedial measures taken by the City to
prevent the recurrence of the poor judgment the investigation revealed,
and is therefore within the ambit of Rule 407. ' 256
While the decision in Specht suffers from the same conclusory and
imprecise vices that plagued the decision in Maddox, especially the
lumping together of the investigation with the resulting remedial action,
the court at least indicated that it understood the significance of the
distinction. It did so by citing Maddox for the proposition that a
disciplinary proceeding was an inadmissible remedial measure, and Bell
252. 792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).
253. Id. at 1417. See also Segura v. City of Reno, 116 F.R.D. 42 (D. Nev. 1987)
(following Maddox: recognizing that the statements of the parties given during the
investigation may be used for impeachment purposes, but the portion of the report concerning
disciplinary recommendations had no impeachment value).
254. 863 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
255. Id. at 701.
256. Id.
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for the proposition that even though an investigatory report may be
admissible, resulting remedial measures should be excluded on the issue
of liability under Rule 407.25
VII. GOVERNMENTAL PRIVILEGES-APPLICATIONS TO INVESTIGA-
TORY REPORTS
An evidentiary governmental privilege may pose a substantial
obstacle to the admissibility of an investigatory report in a federal § 1983
action. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that in federal question
cases, the evidentiary privileges "shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience." 8  It is clear, then, that the
federal common law governs the evidentiary privileges in § 1983
actions."5
257. But see In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816 n.2 (9th Cir.) ("We
need not address the issue of whether post-accident studies generally qualify as remedial
measures under Rule 407."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 917 (1989).
258. FED. R. EVID. 501 in its entirety states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
259. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1991); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d
368 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985); American Civil Liberties Union v.
Finch, 638 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1981); Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic, 619 F.2d 641 (7th
Cir. 1980). Where § 1983 and pendent state law claims are asserted, most courts have applied
the federal law of privileges to both claims. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 197, § 7A.
As with other evidentiary privileges, governmental privileges are litigated most frequently
at the discovery stage. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) defines the scope of
discovery as all matter "not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action .... " The privileges referred to in Rule 26 are the same privileges that are
assertable at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016, at 122 (1970). Therefore,
decisions resolving privilege disputes at the discovery stage are relevant precedents for
privilege issues arising at trial.
Because a large proportion of discovery disputes are referred by federal district court
judges to federal magistrate judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1994) (power to refer
pretrial matters), many discovery decisions are written by the magistrate judges. It is unclear
whether these decisions are entitled to the same precedential weight as decisions of the district
court judges. The writer believes that although it is true that federal magistrates do not enjoy
life tenure and protection against diminution of salary, as the district judges do, the
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There are a number of different governmental privileges.2' The
two with the greatest potential for affecting the admissibility of
investigatory reports in § 1983 actions are the privileges for law
enforcement investigatory materials and, to the limited extent it has
been recognized, for critical self-evaluations.
Like governmental privileges generally,261  the governmental
privilege for law enforcement investigatory materials is qualified and
requires a balancing between the private litigant's need for the
information and the government's interest in non-disclosure.26 z Two
decisions that are especially important for evaluating the law enforce-
ment privilege in § 1983 actions are Judge Becker's decision in
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo2  and Judge Weinstein's decision in King v.
Conde.2' The opinions of these two well-respected, scholarly jurists
provide a detailed analytical framework for resolving claims of
governmental privileges in § 1983 actions.2'
precedential weight of a federal trial court decision should depend upon the strength of the
analysis, not whether the decision was written by a district court judge or by a magistrate
judge.
260. The governmental privileges include privileges for: law enforcement investigatory
materials, grand jury materials, personnel records, deliberate process materials, the legislative
process, and, to the limited extent it has been recognized, critical self-evaluations. See SCHW-
ARTZ, supra note 197, ch. 8. Governmental privileges belong to the government, not to
private individuals who convey information to governmental authorities. Walker v. Huie, 142
F.R.D. 497 (D. Utah 1992) (§ 1983 action).
Courts at times refer to a "governmental," "executive," or "official information" privilege,
without specifying the specific governmental privilege at issue. This may occur at least in
some cases because there is an overlapping with respect to some of the governmental
privileges. For example, investigatory materials most directly implicate the specific privilege
for law enforcement investigatory materials, but may also implicate the privilege for personnel
records or the critical self-evaluation privilege. The label attached to the privilege should not
control. Rather, what is critical is the identification and application of the competing pertinent
interests in favor of the privilege and of disclosure.
261. See 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 110.
262. Mueller v. Walker, 124 F.R.D. 654 (D. Or. 1989); King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Urseth v. City
of Dayton, 110 F.R.D. 245 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Skibo v. City of N.Y., 109 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); Tyner v. City of Jackson, 105 F.R.D. 564 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F.
Supp 1090 (E.D.N.C. 1984); Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293 (D. Idaho 1983); Sirmans v. City
of S. Miami, 86 F.R.D. 492 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Crawford v. Dominic, 469 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Diamond v. City of Mobile, 86 F.R.D. 324 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo,
59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 55, at 103-04.
263. 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
264. 121 F.R.D. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).




In Frankenhauser, a § 1983 deadly force case, the court held that law
enforcement investigatory reports are covered by a qualified privilege
requiring a balancing between "the public interest in the confidentiality
of governmental information against the needs of a litigant to obtain
data, not otherwise available to him, with which to pursue a non-
frivolous cause of action.""6 In balancing these competing interests,
Judge Becker detailed the following ten pertinent considerations:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental
processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government
information; (2) the impact upon persons who have given
information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the degree to
which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program
improvement will be chilled by disclosure; (4) whether the
information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5)
whether the party seeking the discovery is an actual or potential
defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending or reason-
ably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the ... investigation has been completed; (7) whether any
intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may
arise from the investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff's suit is non-
frivolous and brought in good faith; (9) whether the information
sought is available through other discovery or from other sources;
and (10) the importance of the information sought to the
plaintiff's case.
2 67
Of these considerations, several courts have stated that the plaintiff's
need for the information is the most important consideration." s
The ten Frankenhauser factors have been "widely followed"269 by
the lower federal courts. The decision in King v. Conde,"T° building
upon Frankenhauser, contains an even fuller analysis of the issue. At
issue in King was the discoverability of police officer personnel files,
266. Frankenhauser, 59 F.R.D. at 344.
267. Id.
268. See Urseth v. Dayton, 110 F.R.D. 245 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Inmates of Unit 14 v.
Rebideau, 102 F.R.D. 122 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Crawford v. Dominic, 469 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
269. Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1116 (E.D.N.C. 1984). See, e.g., Coughlin v.
Lee, 946 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1991); Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Colo. 1990);
Mueller v. Walker, 124 F.R.D. 654 (D. Or. 1989); Scouler v. Craig, 116 F.R.D. 494 (D.N.J.
1987); Segura v. City of Reno, 116 F.R.D. 42 (D. Nev. 1987); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 110
F.R.D. 245 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Elliott v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293 (D. Idaho 1983); Crawford v.
Dominic, 469 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
270. 121 F.R.D. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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civilian complaint records, disciplinary actions, and external investigatory
materials.
Judge Weinstein established a detailed procedural framework for
evaluating claims of qualified governmental privilege.27' He then
proceeded to evaluate the various factors in balancing the competing
governmental and private interests. Finding Frankenhauser's mere
listing of the factors insufficient, Judge Weinstein attempted to give
guidance about the general importance of the pertinent factors. The
factors favoring disclosure include the following: (1) the relevance and
importance of the information to the plaintiff's case; (2) the strength of
the plaintiff's case; (3) the availability of the information from other
sources; and (4) the important public interest in § 1983 actions. The first
two factors are self-evident, while the last two require some elaboration.
With respect to the availability of the information from other
sources, Judge Weinstein stressed that the district court should consider
not just the availability of alternative sources of information, but also its
quality. It may be that the information in the police department files is
of a better quality than the alternative sources.2' Judge Weinstein
recognized,273 as have other courts, that the special public interest in
271. The procedures adopted included the following:
1. The party invoking the privilege has the burden of justifying its application. Id at 189.
2. "The police must make a 'substantial threshold showing' ... that there are specific
harms likely to accrue from disclosure of specific materials..I.. Id. (quoting Kelly v. San
Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 669 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
3. This showing requires the police department to submit an affidavit from a responsible
official with personal knowledge explaining in non-conclusory terms "how the materials
at issue have been generated or collected; how they have been kept confidential; what
specific interests (e.g., of the police officers, of law enforcement, or of public concern)
would be injured by disclosure .... ." Id.
4. Plaintiff must demonstrate "how the requested material is relevant [and] how the plaintiff
or the public would be injured by nondisclosure . .. ." Id.
5. Consideration should be given to whether sensitive information, such as the officers'
home addresses, should be deleted.
6. At the discovery stage consideration should also be given to the issuance of a protective
order limiting disclosure to only the plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney, or perhaps solely
to plaintiff's attorney. "Such an order can mitigate many if not all of the oft-alleged
injuries to the police and to law enforcement." Id. at 190.
In addition, because disclosure of the contested information in open court can obviously
thwart a claimed privilege, in camera review may be appropriate. The Supreme Court has
stated that "in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful means of dealing with claims
of governmental privilege." Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426
U.S. 394, 406 (1976). See, eg., Castle v. Jallah, 142 F.R.D. 618 (E.D. Va. 1992) (§ 1983
action).




§ 1983 litigation is a highly important factor in favor of disclosure.274
As a federal district court stated, because § 1983 "represents a balancing
feature in our governmental structure whereby individual citizens are
encouraged to police those who are charged with policing us all," "it is
of special import that suits brought under this statute be resolved by a
determination of the truth rather than by a determination that the truth
shall remain hidden.,
275
There are, however, a number of potential governmental interests in
favor of secrecy. Judge Weinstein identified: (1) threats to an officer's
safety; (2) invasion of an officer's privacy; (3) weakening of law
enforcement programs; (4) chilling police investigation candor; and (5)
chilling civilian complaint candor. Although these may be entitled to
some weight, upon careful analysis the governmental interest usually
turns out to not be sufficiently strong to justify non-disclosure, or there
exists an alternative remedy short of non-disclosure. Thus, where there
is a threat to an officer's safety, the district court should give careful
consideration to redacting personnel information such as the officer's
home address. Judge Weinstein found that personnel records, including
discharges, normally do not implicate serious privacy concerns because
the information is not highly personal. However, because information
concerning an officer's psychiatric history is personal, it is necessary to
weigh the officer's privacy interest against the litigant's need for this
information.276
Judge Weinstein found that although police departments frequently
assert that disclosure of personnel and investigatory files will inhibit the
candor of police officers in furnishing information to the department,
this "argument is probably often overstated .... "'7 "First, the
possibility of disclosure to civil rights plaintiffs is probably not of great
import to the officers at the time they file their reports. Second, there
is no empirical evidence of which this court is aware supporting the
'chilling' contention."'278 In fact, there is a strong probability that the
274. See ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1981); Kelly v. San Jose, 114 F.R.D.
653 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293 (D. Idaho 1983); Diamond v. City of
Mobile, 86 F.R.D. 324 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
275. Breier, 54 F.R.D. at 11.
276. King, 121 F.R.D. at 191-92.
277. Id. at 192.
278. Id.
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fear of disclosure will increase rather than chill police candor. 9 And,
although § 1983 defendants often assert that disclosure of law enforce-
ment materials may chill civilian complaint candor, it is most likely that
disclosure of internal materials will have no influence on the willingness
of private citizens to make complaints.'
One governmental interest that Judge Weinstein found was entitled
to considerable weight was the potential for weakening law enforcement
programs. To the extent that the disclosure of police procedural
guidelines reveals police tactics to sinister elements, it "could compro-
mise the effectiveness of law enforcement . ... ."' This is especially
so if the § 1983 claimant is, or is likely to be, a criminal defendant as a
result of the same incident that gave rise to the § 1983 action.'
Some courts have held that the governmental interest is greater when
the investigatory materials relate to an ongoing investigation rather than
to a completed one.' One federal court, for example, stated that
"there is no avowed public policy in barring disclosure of the contents
of police investigatory files that no longer have any relation to any on-
going criminal litigation .... 2M
Although the balancing of competing interests can at times be
difficult, the admission of investigatory reports in § 1983 actions should
rarely be completely barred by governmental privilege. The strong
public interest in § 1983 actions generally weighs heavily in favor of a
full airing of the relevant evidence.' On the other side of the
equation, municipalities normally do not have sufficiently weighty
interests to justify keeping investigatory reports from the trier-of-fact.
In Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 6 the district court decisively rejected
the argument that police officers will be less candid if they know that
investigatory reports are not privileged. The court stated:
These investigations are conducted, at taxpayer expense, to deter-
mine whether the procedures of the department or individual
police officers were responsible for the complained-of incident,
and whether disciplinary or other remedial action is necessary to
279. Id. at 193 (citing Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)).
280. Id. at 193-94.
281. Id. at 192.
282. Judge Weinstein suggested that consideration be given to either the issuance of a
protective order or delaying the § 1983 action until the completion of the criminal prosecu-
tion, before denying discovery altogether. Id.
283. See, e.g., Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
284. Diamond v. City of Mobile, 86 F.R.D. 324, 329 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
285. See Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
286. 93 F.R.D. 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. No legitimate
purpose is served by conducting the investigations under a veil of
near-total of secrecy. Rather, knowledge that a limited number
of persons, as well as a state or federal court, may examine the
file in the event of civil litigation may serve to insure that these
investigations are carried out in an even-handed fashion, that the
statements are carefully and accurately taken, and that the true
facts come to light, whether they reflect favorably or unfavorably
on the individual police officers involved or on the department
as a whole. The claim of executive privilege is therefore
rejected.'
Governmental privilege is not the only privilege that may be asserted
to keep investigatory materials from the trier of fact. Some defendants
have asserted attorney-client and work product privileges, although
usually without success.' For example, in Mercy, the court, in
rejecting the attorney-client privilege, focused upon the fact that the
pertinent communications were not between the police officers and their
attorneys, but between the police officers and those charged with
carrying out the investigation. Further, the investigatory reports were
not the "work product" of an attorney because they were prepared
pursuant to standard police practice and contained primarily factual
accounts of what transpired; they did not contain counsel's legal theories
or analysis.'
In some § 1983 cases, the defendants have asserted a self-evaluation
privilege against the disclosure of investigatory reports. There is a
conflict in the lower federal courts over whether such a privilege exists.
Some federal courts regard it as, "'at the most.., largely undefined and
... not generally ... recognized."' g  One district court called into
287. Id. at 522.
288. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982) (work product and attorney-client
privileges rejected); Kelly v. San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (work product); Mercy
v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (work product and attorney-client);
Diamond v. City of Mobile, 86 F.R.D. 324 (S.D. Ala. 1978) (attorney-client); Frankenhauser
v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (attorney-client).
289. See also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982). In Hoptowit, the circuit
court, with little analysis, concluded that an investigatory report prepared at the direction of
the State Attorney General's office for one of the defendants, the Secretary of the
Department of Social and Health Services, was not within the work product or attorney-client
privileges. The court observed that the report was written by non-lawyers, was not for the
purposes of litigation, and was eventually made public.
290. Bergman v. Kemp, 97 F.R.D. 413,416 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (quoting Lloyd v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1977)).
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question the very existence of such a privilege.29' Although some
lower federal courts have recognized that self-evaluation materials are
shielded by a qualified privilege,2' "[t]he [United States] Supreme
Court and the circuit courts have neither definitively denied the
existence of such a privilege, nor accepted it and defined its scope."'2 9'
Courts that have recognized the privilege seek to justify it on the
basis of the public interest in bringing about evaluations that may lead
to improved operations. For example, in Skibo v. City of New York,294
a § 1983 excessive force case, the district court stated that "[t]he public
has a strong interest in the police department's ability to investigate its
personnel and improve its procedures." On the other hand, the court
ruled that the privilege is not absolute and, in the case at hand, gave
way to the plaintiff's need for the material. The court further found
that:
because the government has a vital interest in upholding the civil
rights of the populace, impediments to judicial fact-finding in a
§ 1983 case are not favored. In addition, courts have declined to
apply the privilege of self critical analysis when the proponent of
the privilege fails to show that the process would be curtailed if
discovery is allowed. The police department needs to continue
to monitor itself to ensure that department procedures are
effective and that officers are complying with these proce-
dures.2 95
The court in Urseth v. City of Dayton,296 however, gave more
weight to the privilege. In that § 1983 deadly force case, the district
court stated:
In order to preserve this important vehicle for self-evaluation,
participating police department supervisors must be allowed to
engage in the type of free-flowing exchange of ideas which can
lead to honest reflection and considered re-evaluation of past
practices. Accordingly, firearms hearing transcripts and summa-
ries like those at issue herein must not, as a general rule, be
291. Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D. 79 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
292. See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (non-
§ 1983 action); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (§ 1983 action);
Skibo v. City of N.Y., 109 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y 1985) (§ 1983 action). The privilege was first
recognized by the federal courts in Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.
1970), affda 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
293. Dowling v. American Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992).
294. 109 F.R.D. 58, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
295. Id. at 64 (citations omitted).
296. 653 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
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discoverable. Requests by plaintiffs for disclosure of such
materials should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to deter-
mine whether 'exceptional circumstances' in a particular case
would warrant discovery of firearms hearings documents."9
Nevertheless, the court found that "exceptional circumstances" in fact
warranted disclosure because the plaintiff demonstrated the relevance
of the requested materials to the Police Chiefs credibility and to the
municipal liability claim, and showed that there had already been public
disclosure of the firearms hearing. "As there has already been public
disclosure of the Firearms Hearing .... the chilling effect which would
accompany the disclosure of these documents is reduced." '
The Ninth Circuit in Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises,299 a
Jones Act case, analyzed the critical self-evaluation privilege. Assuming,
arguendo, that such a privilege exists, the court articulated four
requirements that would have to be satisfied for the privilege to come
into play:
first, the information must result from a critical self-analysis
undertaken by the party seeking protection; second, the public
must have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the type
of information sought; finally, the information must be of the
type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed.
To these requirements should be added the general proviso that
no document will be accorded a privilege unless it was prepared
with the expectation that it would be kept confidential, and has
in fact been kept confidential.3"
297. 1& at 1061 (emphasis in original).
298. Id. at 1062 (emphasis in original).
299. 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
300. Id. at 426 (citation omitted). Applying these standards, the circuit court in Dowling
ruled that the privilege did not apply to voluntary, routine pre-accident corporate safety
reviews. The court did not believe that these reviews would likely be curtailed if they were
subject to disclosure, and did not expect that they are always "performed with the expectation
that they will be kept confidential." Id. The court placed great weight on the voluntary
nature of the safety review. "It may be unfair for a court to require a party to turn over to
an opposing litigant self-damning assessments that the government has required it to prepare.
But this concern obviously does not exist when the party has engaged in the self-evaluation
voluntarily." Id. at 426-27 (citations omitted). The court also stressed that there is an
important distinction between pre-accident safety reviews and post-accident investigations.
This is because a "candid analysis" of the causes of an accident or other incident that has
already occurred is more likely to be chilled by disclosure than routine pre-incident safety
reviews. Id. at 427. Pre-incident reviews are designed to prevent accidents and thus avoid
litigation. It is unlikely that this type of review will be inhibited by the fear that it might be
disclosed in future hypothetical litigation. The same cannot be said about a post-incident
review.
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Although the debate over the existence of a critical self-evaluation
privilege may be of significance in other contexts, this is not the case as
applied to the admissibility of investigatory reports on § 1983 actions.
This is because the pertinent competing private and governmental
interests are already considered under the qualified privilege for
investigatory materials. Given the existence of this privilege in the
§ 1983 investigatory report context, a critical self-evaluation privilege
seems to be superfluous.
Finally, investigatory reports containing the names of confidential
informers may implicate the well-established qualified privilege for the
identity of confidential informants."1  In Roviaro v. United States,302
the Supreme Court explained that in criminal cases the qualified nature
of the privilege requires a balancing between the public interest in
encouraging individuals to supply information of criminal wrongdoing to
the government and the criminal defendant's need for the information
to prepare a defense. This balancing must be based upon the particular
circumstances of each case. In criminal cases, "[w]here the disclosure of
an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give way."3 3
Roviaro's balancing of competing public and private interests has
been extended to civil cases and applied by the federal courts in several
§ 1983 actions."° In civil cases, the critical issues are "whether
301. In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957), a criminal case, the United
States Supreme Court defined the privilege as "the Government's privilege to withhold from
disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with enforcement of that law." Its purpose is to preserve the informer's anonymity
so that citizens will be encouraged to communicate information concerning criminal activity
to law enforcement officers. Id. See also Holman v. Cayre, 873 F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1989)
(§ 1983 action). The privilege is strictly limited to the identity of the informant. Thus, the
contents of the informant's communication are not privileged and may be disclosed, so long
as the contents do not reveal the identity of the informant. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60;
GRAHAM, supra note 40, § 510.1. The privilege belongs to and thus may be raised only by
the government or its officials, and not by the informant. 2 STRONG, supra note 36, § 111;
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 510(b). See, e.g., Belfeuil v. Waushara County, 675 F.
Supp. 459 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (County Board of Supervisors is proper party to invoke privilege).
302. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
303. Id. at 60-61. The balancing should occur in camera. United States v. Straughter,
950 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1238, 1505, 1601 (1992).
304. Hoffman v. Reali, 973 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1992); Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152 (5th
Cir. 1991); Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1989); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); Ghandi v. Police Dept. of City of Detroit, 747
F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1984); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Michelson v. Daly, 590 F. Supp. 261 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). See also
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disclosure is essential to the fair determination of a party's cause,""
and whether "the need for disclosure outweighs the need for secre-
cy."3°6 The availability of alternative means of obtaining the informa-
tion weighs against disclosure, as does the possibility of retaliation
against the informant, "particularly where he is an employee of the
target of the investigation, or has been assured by a law enforcement
official that his identity will not be disclosed.' 31
The decisional law provides guidance as to how this balancing should
be weighed. The privilege is stronger and more likely to be sustained
in civil than in criminal cases because the stakes of the private civil
litigant are normally not as high as those of the criminal defendant.31
The Sixth Circuit in a § 1983 action ruled that where the informant was
neither a witness nor an active participant in the conduct at issue in the
civil case, it will normally be very difficult to overcome the privilege.319
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in a § 1983 action stated that
"[t]he assertion of informer's privilege by a law enforcement official
defending against a civil suit for damages based on his own alleged
official misconduct should be scrutinized closely. 3 1 1 In civil cases, the
district courts have especially broad discretion to determine whether or
not to order disclosure of an informer's identity; denial of disclosure will
be overturned only for an abuse of discretion resulting in substantial
prejudice.3 '
Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
305. Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
306. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987).
307. Cullen, 811 F.2d at 716 (citations omitted). See also Ghandi v. Police Dept. of City
of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1984); Michelson v. Daly, 590 F. Supp 261 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
308. In re Search of 1638 E. 2nd Street, 993 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1993); Hoffman v. Reali,
973 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1992); Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944,946-47 (6th Cir. 1989); Michelson
v. Daly, 590 F. Supp. 261, 264-265 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36,
§ 510[05]. For examples of § 1983 cases sustaining the privilege, see Hoffnan v. Reali, 973
F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1992); Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1989); Cullen v. Margiotta,
811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); Ghandi v. Police Dept. of City of
Detroit, 747 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1984); Michelson v. Daly, 590 F. Supp. 261 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
For examples of § 1983 cases requiring disclosure, see Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600
(7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Belfeuil v. Waushara County, 675
F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
309. Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1989). In these circumstances the
party seeking disclosure bears the "formidable burden" of making "a compelling demonstra-
tion that the information sought from the informant is likely to influence the outcome of the
case or is essential to the party's preparation for trial." Id.
310. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 638 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
446 U.S. 754 (1980).
311. Cullen, 811 F.2d at 716; Ghandi, 747 F.2d at 354.
[Vol. 79:453
ADMISSIBILITY OF INVESTIGATORY REPORTS
VIII. CONCLUSION
Rule 803(8)(C) raises a broad array of important, contentious
evidentiary issues. It authorizes the admission of governmental
investigatory reports even though the investigators, the preparers of the
report, and the suppliers of information are not subject to cross-
examination. At the same time, governmental investigatory reports may
contain highly important information for § 1983 actions. Further,
because they carry the imprimatur of government, they are likely to be
given great weight by the jury. The most critical evidentiary issue in
§ 1983 actions, as in other contexts, is the report's trustworthiness. For
if the report is trustworthy, there is a great likelihood that it will not
only be found to fall within the Rule 803(8)(C) hearsay exception, but
also satisfy Rule 403 and overcome asserted governmental privileges.
Investigatory reports found to be trustworthy are especially likely to be
admitted in § 1983 actions because of the special public interest in
§ 1983 civil rights actions that all of the relevant, reliable evidence be
considered by the trier of fact.
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